Related papers: Sequential decomposition of stochastic Stackelberg…
We study decentralized equilibrium selection in stochastic games under severe information and communication constraints. In such settings, convergence to equilibrium alone is insufficient, as stochastic games typically admit many equilibria…
This paper addresses a linear-quadratic Stackelberg mean field (MF) games and teams problem with arbitrary population sizes, where the game among the followers is further categorized into two types: non-cooperative and cooperative, and the…
There has been significant recent interest in game-theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model. Among the major applications are the ARMOR program…
We study automated intrusion response for an IT infrastructure and formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as a partially observed stochastic game. To solve the game we follow an approach where attack and defense…
Guided trajectory planning involves a leader robot strategically directing a follower robot to collaboratively reach a designated destination. However, this task becomes notably challenging when the leader lacks complete knowledge of the…
In this paper, we first consider a pinning node selection and control gain co-design problem for complex networks. A necessary and sufficient condition for the synchronization of the pinning controlled networks at a homogeneous state is…
Interdicting a criminal with limited police resources is a challenging task as the criminal changes location over time. The size of the large transportation network further adds to the difficulty of this scenario. To tackle this issue, we…
In this paper, we establish a dynamic game to allocate CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) to the members of a supply chain. We propose a model of a three-tier supply chain in a decentralized state which includes a supplier, a…
In this paper,we mainly focus on the numerical solution of high-dimensional stochastic optimal control problem driven by fully-coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs in short) through deep learning. We first…
In this paper, we employ a hypergame framework to analyze the single-leader-multiple-followers (SLMF) Stackelberg security game with two typical misinformed situations: misperception and deception. We provide a stability criterion with the…
Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable…
Two-player mean-payoff Stackelberg games are nonzero-sum infinite duration games played on a bi-weighted graph by Leader (Player 0) and Follower (Player 1). Such games are played sequentially: first, Leader announces her strategy, second,…
We study a two-player discounted zero-sum stochastic game model for dynamic operational planning in military campaigns. At each stage, the players manage multiple commanders who order military actions on objectives that have an open line of…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…
In this work, a novel Stackelberg game theoretic framework is proposed for trading energy bidirectionally between the demand-response (DR) aggregator and the prosumers. This formulation allows for flexible energy arbitrage and additional…
Cyber deception is an emerging proactive defense strategy to counter increasingly sophisticated attacks such as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) by misleading and distracting attackers from critical assets. However, since deception…
We provide results of a deterministic approximation for non-Markovian stochastic processes modeling finite populations of individuals who recurrently play symmetric finite games and imitate each other according to payoffs. We show that a…
We consider the following two-player game: using observational data, the leader chooses a prediction function for a response variable $Y$ from given covariates. The follower then reacts with an intervention on some covariates in the…
We consider a distributed stochastic approximation (SA) scheme for computing an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash game. Standard SA schemes employ diminishing steplength sequences that are square summable but not summable. Such requirements…