Related papers: An attack to quantum systems through RF radiation …
We study potential security vulnerabilities of a single-photon detector based on superconducting transition-edge sensor. In a simple experiment, we show that an adversary could fake a photon number result at a certain wavelength by sending…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information theoretic secure key as long as the device performs as assumed in the theoretical model. One of the assumptions is an absence of information leakage about individual photon detection…
Avalanche photodiode based single photon detectors, as crucial and practical components, are widely used in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. For effective detection, most of these SPDs are operated in the gated mode, in which the…
We introduce the concept of a superlinear threshold detector, a detector that has a higher probability to detect multiple photons if it receives them simultaneously rather than at separate times. Highly superlinear threshold detectors in…
The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics allow two remote parties to communicate a private, secret key, which is protected from eavesdropping by the laws of physics. So-called quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations always rely…
We propose and experimentally demonstrate a scheme to render the detection apparatus of a Quantum Key Distribution system immune to the main classes of hacking attacks in which the eavesdropper explores the back-door opened by the…
In practical quantum key distribution systems, imperfect physical devices open security loopholes that challenge the core promise of this technology. Apart from various side channels, a vulnerability of single-photon detectors to blinding…
Quantum Key Distribution with the BB84 protocol has been shown to be unconditionally secure even using weak coherent pulses instead of single-photon signals. The distances that can be covered by these methods are limited due to the loss in…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols are proven secure based on fundamental physical laws, however, the proofs consider a well-defined setting and encoding of the sent quantum signals only. Side channels, where the encoded quantum state…
Counterfactual quantum key distribution protocols allow two sides to establish a common secret key using an insecure channel and authenticated public communication. As opposed to many other quantum key distribution protocols, part of the…
We present a method to control the detection events in quantum key distribution systems that use gated single-photon detectors. We employ bright pulses as faked states, timed to arrive at the avalanche photodiodes outside the activation…
The information theoretic security promised by quantum key distribution (QKD) holds as long as the assumptions in the theoretical model match the parameters in the physical implementation. The superlinear behaviour of sensitive…
Silicon avalanche photodiodes are the most sensitive photodetectors in the visible to near infrared region. However, when they are used for single photon detection in a Geiger mode, they are known to emit light on the controlled breakdown…
Physical layer authentication relies on detecting unique imperfections in signals transmitted by radio devices to isolate their fingerprint. Recently, deep learning-based authenticators have increasingly been proposed to classify devices…
By employing real-time monitoring of single-photon avalanche photodiodes we demonstrate how two types of practical eavesdropping strategies, the after-gate and time-shift attacks, may be detected. Both attacks are identified with the…
Practical implementations of quantum cryptography use attenuated laser pulses as the signal source rather than single photons. The channels used to transmit are also lossy. Here we give a simple derivation of two beam-splitting attacks on…
InGaAs single-photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are key enablers for high-bit rate quantum key distribution. However, the deviation of such detectors from ideal models can open side-channels for an eavesdropper, Eve, to exploit. The…
Imperfect devices in commercial quantum key distribution systems open security loopholes that an eavesdropper may exploit. An example of one such imperfection is the wavelength dependent coupling ratio of the fiber beam splitter. Utilizing…
Radio Frequency Fingerprinting (RFF) techniques allow a receiver to authenticate a transmitter by analyzing the physical layer of the radio spectrum. Although the vast majority of scientific contributions focus on improving the performance…
We report the first gigahertz clocked decoy-protocol quantum key distribution (QKD). Record key rates have been achieved thanks to the use of self-differencing InGaAs avalanche photodiodes designed specifically for high speed single photon…