Related papers: Group-level selection avoids the tragedy of the co…
Our model describes competition between groups driven by the choices of self-interested voters within groups. Within a Poisson voting environment, parties observe aggregate support from groups and can allocate prizes or punishments to them.…
Strong reciprocity is a fundamental human characteristic associated with our extraordinary sociality and cooperation. Laboratory experiments on social dilemma games and many field studies have quantified well-defined levels of cooperation…
Productive societies feature high levels of cooperation and strong connections between individuals. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are frequently used to study the development of social connections and cooperative behavior in model societies. In…
Understanding the emergence of cooperation in social networks has advanced through pairwise interactions, but the corresponding theory for group-based public goods games (PGGs) remains less explored. Here, we provide theoretical conditions…
This paper characterizes how different incentive instruments shape cooperation in a repeated Prisoner`s Dilemma with a continuum of players. A simple tit-for-tat strategy competes against unconditional defection, and the long-run outcome is…
A good group reputation often facilitates more efficient synergistic teamwork in production activities. Here we translate this simple motivation into a reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism in the public goods game.…
Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies. Observational data suggest that a wide variety of behaviors may spread in human social networks,…
Working together in groups may be beneficial if compared to isolated efforts. Yet this is true only if all group members contribute to the success. If not, group efforts may act detrimentally on the fitness of their members. Here we study…
The public goods game is a model of a society investing some assets and regaining a profit, although can also model biological populations. In the classic public goods game only two strategies compete: either cooperate or defect; a third…
Cooperation among self-interested players in a social dilemma is fragile and easily interrupted by mistakes. In this work, we study the repeated $n$-person public-goods game and search for a strategy that forms a cooperative Nash…
Purpose: We propose a model to present a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioural structures by simulating an agent based on the evolutionary public good game with available social learning. Methods: The model considered a…
Previous research has highlighted the importance of strong heterogeneity for the successful evolution of cooperation in games governed by pairwise interactions. Here we determine to what extent this is true for games governed by group…
Studying social dilemmas prompts the question of how cooperation can emerge in situations where individuals are expected to act selfishly. Here, in the framework of the one-shot Public Goods Game (PGG), we introduce the concept that…
Collective intelligence is the ability of a group to perform more effectively than any individual alone. Diversity among group members is a key condition for the emergence of collective intelligence, but maintaining diversity is challenging…
Collective actions, from city marathons to labor strikes, are often mass-driven and subject to the snowball effect. Motivated by this, we study evolutionary advantages of conditional punishment in the spatial public goods game. Unlike…
Economic experiments have shown that punishment can increase public goods game contributions over time. However, the effectiveness of punishment is challenged by second-order freeriding and antisocial punishment. The latter implies that…
Social dilemmas are situations in which collective welfare is at odds with individual gain. One widely studied example, due to the conflict it poses between human behaviour and game theoretic reasoning, is the Traveler's Dilemma. The…
Indirect punishment traditionally sustains cooperation in social systems through reputation or norms, often by reducing defectors' payoffs indirectly. In this study, we redefine indirect punishment for structured populations as a spatially…
The fact that individuals will most likely behave differently in different situations begets the introduction of conditional strategies. Inspired by this, we study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, where besides…
Empirical studies have shown that individuals' behaviors are largely influenced by social conformity, including punishment. However, a coevolutionary theoretical framework that takes into account effects of conformity on individuals'…