Related papers: Deceptive Labeling: Hypergames on Graphs for Steal…
In this paper, we study the use of deception for strategic planning in adversarial environments. We model the interaction between the agent (player 1) and the adversary (player 2) as a two-player concurrent game in which the adversary has…
We study a class of games, in which the adversary (attacker) is to satisfy a complex mission specified in linear temporal logic, and the defender is to prevent the adversary from achieving its goal. A deceptive defender can allocate decoys,…
Strategic deception is an act of manipulating the opponent's perception to gain strategic advantages. In this paper, we study synthesis of deceptive winning strategies in two-player turn-based zero-sum reachability games on graphs with…
In this chapter, we present an approach using formal methods to synthesize reactive defense strategy in a cyber network, equipped with a set of decoy systems. We first generalize formal graphical security models--attack graphs--to…
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…
This paper is concerned with the synthesis of strategies in network systems with active cyber deception. Active deception in a network employs decoy systems and other defenses to conduct defensive planning against the intrusion of malicious…
Deception plays a crucial role in strategic interactions with incomplete information. Motivated by security applications, we study a class of two-player turn-based deterministic games with one-sided incomplete information, in which player 1…
In many security applications of cyber-physical systems, a system designer must guarantee that critical missions are satisfied against attacks in the sensors and actuators of the CPS. Traditional security design of CPSs often assume that…
Systems operating in adversarial environments may inadvertently leak sensitive information to adversaries. To address this challenge, we revisit the linear-quadratic control framework and introduce deception to actively mislead adversaries.…
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. For the applications of cyber deception, non-cooperative games become a natural choice of models to capture the adversarial interactions…
Differences in perception, information asymmetries, and bounded rationality lead game-theoretic players to derive a private, subjective view of the game that may diverge from the underlying ground-truth scenario and may be misaligned with…
Deception plays critical roles in economics and technology, especially in emerging interactions in cyberspace. Holistic models of deception are needed in order to analyze interactions and to design mechanisms that improve them. Game theory…
We study deception in adversarial graph traversal, where a mobile agent seeks to reach a goal with minimum cost while an adversary alters edge costs to increase the total traversal cost. Unlike prior works that assume fixed…
We introduce deceptive signaling framework as a new defense measure against advanced adversaries in cyber-physical systems. In general, adversaries look for system-related information, e.g., the underlying state of the system, in order to…
We consider a class of two-player turn-based zero-sum games on graphs with reachability objectives, known as reachability games, where the objective of Player 1 (P1) is to reach a set of goal states, and that of Player 2 (P2) is to prevent…
We study a class of two-player competitive concurrent stochastic games on graphs with reachability objectives. Specifically, player 1 aims to reach a subset $F_1$ of game states, and player 2 aims to reach a subset $F_2$ of game states…
In adversarial settings, a mobile agent may strategically plan its motion to influence an opponent's inference about its intended goal. We study deceptive path planning in a scenario where a mobile agent aims to reach a privately selected…
This paper investigates the problem of synthesizing proactive defense systems in which the defender can allocate deceptive targets and modify the cost of actions for the attacker who aims to compromise security assets in this system. We…
Classical game-theoretic models typically assume rational agents, complete information, and common knowledge of payoffs - assumptions that are often violated in real-world MAS characterized by uncertainty, misaligned perceptions, and nested…
In this paper, we present a novel, game-theoretic model of deception in two-player, zero-sum games. Our framework leverages an information asymmetry: one player (the deceiver) has access to accurate payoff information, while the other (the…