Related papers: Reselling Information
The solution to science's replication crisis is a new ecosystem in which scientists sell what they learn from their research. In each pairwise transaction, the information seller makes (loses) money if he turns out to be correct…
Consumers can acquire information through their own search efforts or through their social network. Information diffusion via word-of-mouth communication leads to some consumers free-riding on their "friends" and less information…
Resource distribution is a fundamental problem in economic and policy design, particularly when demand and supply are not naturally aligned. Without regulation, wealthier individuals may monopolize this resource, leaving the needs of others…
We introduce an interactive market setup with sequential auctions where agents receive variegated signals with a known deadline. The effects of differential information and mutual learning on the allocation of overall profit \& loss (P\&L)…
We consider a market of risky financial assets whose participants are an informed trader, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers. We prove the existence of a market-clearing equilibrium when the insider…
If you recommend a product to me and I buy it, how much should you be paid by the seller? And if your sole interest is to maximize the amount paid to you by the seller for a sequence of recommendations, how should you recommend optimally if…
We study the revenue-maximizing mechanism when a buyer's value evolves endogenously because of learning-by-consuming. A seller sells one unit of a divisible good, while the buyer relies on his private, rough valuation to choose his…
A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal…
We study the power of price discrimination via an intermediary in bilateral trade, when there is a revenue-maximizing seller selling an item to a buyer with a private value drawn from a prior. Between the seller and the buyer, there is an…
We consider a pair of traders in a market where the information available to the second trader is a strict subset of the information available to the first trader. The traders make prices based on the information available concerning a…
We study an information acquisition problem in which an informed trader acquires costly information prior to trading in the Kyle equilibrium. The cost of information acquisition is represented by an entropy cost. Regardless of the prior…
The present paper shows that it can be advantageous for traders to publish their information on the true value of an asset even if they (i) cannot build a position in the asset prior to the publication of their information and (ii) cannot…
On ad exchange platforms the place for advertisement is sold through different kinds of auctions. However, it is not uncommon the situation where the seller repeatedly encounters only one buyer, thus the posted price auction degenerates…
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period.…
Motivated by the emergence of popular service-based two-sided markets where sellers can serve multiple buyers at the same time, we formulate and study the {\em two-sided cost sharing} problem. In two-sided cost sharing, sellers incur…
We study the limits of an information intermediary in the classical Bayesian auction, where a revenue-maximizing seller sells one item to $n$ buyers with independent private values. In addition, we have an intermediary who knows the buyers'…
We study the price competition in a duopoly with an arbitrary number of buyers. Each seller can offer multiple units of a commodity depending on the availability of the commodity which is random and may be different for different sellers.…
We test the predictions of the sticky information model using a survey dataset by comparing shoppers accuracy in recalling the prices of regulated and comparable unregulated products. Because regulated product prices are capped, they are…
This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation.…
We investigate common knowledge equilibrium of separable (or parity) and totally symmetric Boolean securities in distributed information market. We theoretically show that clearing price converges to the true value when a common prior…