Related papers: Equilibrium Selection in Data Markets: Multiple-Pr…
We study Fisher markets that admit equilibria wherein each good is integrally assigned to some agent. While strong existence and computational guarantees are known for equilibria of Fisher markets with additive valuations, such equilibria,…
We study an equilibrium-based continuous asset pricing problem for the securities market. In the previous work [16], we have shown that a certain price process, which is given by the solution to a forward backward stochastic differential…
Stable matching, a classical model for two-sided markets, has long been studied with little consideration for how each side's preferences are learned. With the advent of massive online markets powered by data-driven matching platforms, it…
The design of energy markets is a subject of ongoing debate, particularly concerning the choice between the widely adopted Pay-as-Clear (PC) pricing mechanism and the alternative Pay-as-Bid (PB). These mechanisms determine how energy…
In recent years, data has played an increasingly important role in the economy as a good in its own right. In many settings, data aggregators cannot directly verify the quality of the data they purchase, nor the effort exerted by data…
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations.…
Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik,…
We study the problem of online learning in two-sided non-stationary matching markets, where the objective is to converge to a stable match. In particular, we consider the setting where one side of the market, the arms, has fixed known set…
We consider the problem of belief aggregation: given a group of individual agents with probabilistic beliefs over a set of uncertain events, formulate a sensible consensus or aggregate probability distribution over these events. Researchers…
We propose a decentralized market model in which agents can negotiate bilateral contracts. This builds on a similar, but centralized, model of trading networks introduced by Hatfield et al. in 2013. Prior work has established that…
Data only generates value for a few organizations with expertise and resources to make data shareable, discoverable, and easy to integrate. Sharing data that is easy to discover and integrate is hard because data owners lack information…
We propose new results for the existence and uniqueness of a general nonparametric and nonseparable competitive equilibrium with substitutes. These results ensure the invertibility of a general competitive system. The existing literature…
A competitive market is modeled as a game of incomplete information. One player observes some payoff-relevant state and can sell (possibly noisy) messages thereof to the other, whose willingness to pay is contingent on their own beliefs. We…
In this paper, we study multi-agent systems with decentralized resource allocations. Agents have local demand and resource supply, and are interconnected through a network designed to support sharing of the local resource; and the network…
We characterize zonal ancillary market coupling relying on noncooperative game theory. To that purpose, we formulate the ancillary market as a multi-leader single follower bilevel problem, that we subsequently cast as a generalized Nash…
This thesis develops equilibrium asset pricing models in incomplete markets with a large number of heterogeneous agents using mean field game theory. The market equilibrium is characterized by a novel form of mean field backward stochastic…
Collusion in market pricing is a concept associated with human actions to raise market prices through artificially limited supply. Recently, the idea of algorithmic collusion was put forward, where the human action in the pricing process is…
The immense success of ML systems relies heavily on large-scale, high-quality data. The high demand for data has led to many paradigms that involve selling, exchanging, and sharing data, motivating the study of economic processes with data…
The dual crises of the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the global financial crisis has prompted a call for explanations of non-equilibrium market dynamics. Recently a promising approach has been the use of agent based models (ABMs) to…
The existence of a (partial) market equilibrium price is proved in a complete, continuous time finite-agent market setting. The economic agents act as price takers in a fully competitive setting and maximize exponential utility from…