Related papers: Approximate Equilibrium Computation for Discrete-T…
We formulate and study a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic dynamic games with partial and asymmetric information. Information asymmetry introduces fundamental challenges involving \emph{belief representation} and \emph{theory of mind}…
This work investigates the ambient potential identification problem in inverse Mean-Field Games (MFGs), where the goal is to recover the unknown potential from the value function at equilibrium. We propose a simple yet effective iterative…
We present a Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithm to solve infinite horizon asymptotic Mean Field Game (MFG) and Mean Field Control (MFC) problems. Our approach can be described as a unified two-timescale Mean Field Q-learning: The…
Finite-state mean-field games (MFGs) arise as limits of large interacting particle systems and are governed by an MFG system, a coupled forward-backward differential equation consisting of a forward Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck (KFP) equation…
In this work, we consider a novel inverse problem in mean-field games (MFG). We aim to recover the MFG model parameters that govern the underlying interactions among the population based on a limited set of noisy partial observations of the…
Mean-field games (MFGs) study the Nash equilibrium of systems with a continuum of interacting agents, which can be formulated as the fixed-point of optimal control problems. They provide a unified framework for a variety of applications,…
A mean-field game (MFG) seeks the Nash Equilibrium of a game involving a continuum of players, where the Nash Equilibrium corresponds to a fixed point of the best-response mapping. However, simple fixed-point iterations do not always…
In this paper, we study a large population game with heterogeneous dynamics and cost functions solving a consensus problem. Moreover, the agents have communication constraints which appear as: (1) an Additive-White Gaussian Noise (AWGN)…
We develop the fictitious play algorithm in the context of the linear programming approach for mean field games of optimal stopping and mean field games with regular control and absorption. This algorithm allows to approximate the mean…
This paper proposes a finite-horizon approximation scheme and introduces episodic equilibrium as a solution concept for stochastic games (SGs), where agents strategize based on the current state and episode stage. The paper also establishes…
We establish the convergence of the deep actor-critic reinforcement learning algorithm presented in [Angiuli et al., 2023a] in the setting of continuous state and action spaces with an infinite discrete-time horizon. This algorithm provides…
We investigate mean-field games (MFG) in which agents can actively control their speed of access to information. Specifically, the agents can dynamically decide to obtain observations with reduced delay by accepting higher observation…
In this paper we formulate and solve a mean-field game described by a linear stochastic dynamics and a quadratic or exponential-quadratic cost functional for each generic player. The optimal strategies for the players are given explicitly…
This paper considers mean field games with optimal stopping time (OSMFGs) where agents make optimal exit decisions, the coupled obstacle and Fokker-Planck equations in such models pose challenges versus classic MFGs. This paper proposes a…
We provide a thorough study of a general class of linear-quadratic extended mean field games and control problems in any dimensions where the mean field terms are allowed to be unbounded and there are also presence of cross terms in the…
Mean field games (MFG) and mean field control problems (MFC) are frameworks to study Nash equilibria or social optima in games with a continuum of agents. These problems can be used to approximate competitive or cooperative games with a…
This paper presents a novel data-driven approach for approximating the $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium in continuous-time linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) games, where multiple agents interact with each other through their dynamics and…
We propose a reinforcement learning algorithm for stationary mean-field games, where the goal is to learn a pair of mean-field state and stationary policy that constitutes the Nash equilibrium. When viewing the mean-field state and the…
Financial markets are often driven by latent factors which traders cannot observe. Here, we address an algorithmic trading problem with collections of heterogeneous agents who aim to perform optimal execution or statistical arbitrage, where…
We present a midpoint policy iteration algorithm to solve linear quadratic optimal control problems in both model-based and model-free settings. The algorithm is a variation of Newton's method, and we show that in the model-based setting it…