Related papers: SpectreRewind: Leaking Secrets to Past Instruction…

Many organizations protect secure networked devices from non-secure networked devices by assigning each class of devices to a different logical network. These two logical networks, commonly called the host network and the guest network, use…

Since the advent of Spectre attacks, researchers and practitioners have developed a range of hardware and software measures to counter transient execution attacks. A prime example of such mitigation is speculative load hardening in LLVM,…

Secure speculation schemes have shown great promise in the war against speculative side-channel attacks, and will be a key building block for developing secure, high-performance architectures moving forward. As the field matures, the need…

Machine learning has become mainstream across industries. Numerous examples proved the validity of it for security applications. In this work, we investigate how to reverse engineer a neural network by using only power side-channel…

Hardware caches are essential performance optimization features in modern processors to reduce the effective memory access time. Unfortunately, they are also the prime targets for attacks on computer processors because they are…

Air-gapped computers are systems that are kept isolated from the Internet since they store or process sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce an optical covert channel in which an attacker can leak (or, exfiltlrate) sensitive…

Side channel attacks steal secret keys by cleverly leveraging information leakages and can, therefore, break encryption. Thus, detection and mitigation of side channel attacks is a very important problem, but the solutions proposed in the…

Network slicing in 5G and the future 6G networks will enable the creation of multiple virtualized networks on a shared physical infrastructure. This innovative approach enables the provision of tailored networks to accommodate specific…

We note that constituent fields (notably the fraction-of-seconds timestamp field) in the data payload structure of the synchrophasor communication protocol (IEEE C37.118 standard) are overprovisioned relative to real-world usage and needs,…

Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to deep learning models by allowing adversaries to implant hidden behaviors that remain dormant on clean inputs but are maliciously triggered at inference. Existing backdoor attack methods typically…

Shared caches are vulnerable to side channel attacks through contention in cache sets. Besides being a simple source of information leak, these side channels form useful gadgets for more sophisticated attacks that compromise the security of…

We introduce the first microarchitectural side channel attacks that leverage contention on the CPU ring interconnect. There are two challenges that make it uniquely difficult to exploit this channel. First, little is known about the ring…

Microarchitectural timing channels enable unwanted information flow across security boundaries, violating fundamental security assumptions. They leverage timing variations of several state-holding microarchitectural components and have been…

Covert channels is a vital setup in the analysing the strength of security in a network.Covert Channel is illegitimate channelling over the secured channel and establishes a malicious conversation.The trapdoor set in such channels…

Side-channel information leakage is a known limitation of SGX. Researchers have demonstrated that secret-dependent information can be extracted from enclave execution through page-fault access patterns. Consequently, various recent research…

Side-channel attacks exploit unintended information leakage from system behavior and continue to pose serious privacy risks in modern platforms. Despite extensive prior work, side-channel analysis remains largely manual and fragmented,…

Speculative vulnerabilities such as Spectre and Meltdown expose speculative execution state that can be exploited to leak information across security domains via side-channels. Such vulnerabilities often stay undetected for a long time as…

The recent Spectre attacks has demonstrated the fundamental insecurity of current computer microarchitecture. The attacks use features like pipelining, out-of-order and speculation to extract arbitrary information about the memory contents…

The recent Spectre attacks have demonstrated that modern microarchitectural optimizations can make software insecure. These attacks use features like pipelining, out-of-order and speculation to extract information about the memory contents…

Compression algorithms are widely used as they save memory without losing data. However, elimination of redundant symbols and sequences in data leads to a compression side channel. So far, compression attacks have only focused on the…