Related papers: Computing the proportional veto core
In light of the classic impossibility results of Arrow and Gibbard and Satterthwaite regarding voting with ordinal rules, there has been recent interest in characterizing how well common voting rules approximate the social optimum. In order…
The median voter theorem has long been the default model of voter behavior and candidate choice. While contemporary work on the distribution of political opinion has emphasized polarization and an increasing gap between the "left" and the…
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are…
We analyse strategic, complete information, sequential voting with ordinal preferences over the alternatives. We consider several voting mechanisms: plurality voting and approval voting with deterministic or uniform tie-breaking rules. We…
An important problem in computational social choice theory is the complexity of undesirable behavior among agents, such as control, manipulation, and bribery in election systems. These kinds of voting strategies are often tempting at the…
A population of voters must elect representatives among themselves to decide on a sequence of possibly unforeseen binary issues. Voters care only about the final decision, not the elected representatives. The disutility of a voter is…
Fairness in multiwinner elections, a growing line of research in computational social choice, primarily concerns the use of constraints to ensure fairness. Recent work proposed a model to find a diverse \emph{and} representative committee…
It is common that a jury must grade a set of candidates in a cardinal scale such as {1,2,3,4,5} or an ordinal scale such as {Great, Good, Average, Bad }. When the number of candidates is very large such as hotels (BOOKING), restaurants…
Proportional representation (PR) is one of the central principles in voting. Elegant rules with compelling PR axiomatic properties have the potential to be adopted for several important collective decision making settings. I survey some…
In this paper, I introduce a novel stability axiom for stochastic voting rules, called self-equivalence, by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself will choose not to do so. I then show that under the…
The rise of algorithmic decision-making has created an explosion of research around the fairness of those algorithms. While there are many compelling notions of individual fairness, beginning with the work of Dwork et al., these notions…
The resilience of a voting system has been a central topic in computational social choice. Many voting rules, like plurality, are shown to be vulnerable as the attacker can target specific voters to manipulate the result. What if a local…
Computational social choice and algorithmic decision theory offer rich aggregation theory but no comprehensive process for egalitarian self-governance: aggregation, deliberation, amendment, and consensus are each considered in isolation,…
This paper proposes normative criteria for voting rules under uncertainty about individual preferences. The criteria emphasize the importance of responsiveness, i.e., the probability that the social outcome coincides with the realized…
May's Theorem (1952), a celebrated result in social choice, provides the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that…
We study the problem of minimizing metric distortion in multi-winner elections, where a committee of size $k$ is selected from a set of candidates based on voters' ordinal preferences. We assume that voters and candidates are embedded on a…
There is a striking relationship between a three hundred years old Political Science theorem named "Condorcet's jury theorem" (1785), which states that majorities are more likely to choose correctly when individual votes are often correct…
We exhibit the hidden beauty of weighted voting and voting power by applying a generalization of the Penrose-Banzhaf index to social choice rules. Three players who have multiple votes in a committee decide between three options by…
Consider an undirected graph G, representing a social network, where each node is blue or red, corresponding to positive or negative opinion on a topic. In the voter model, in discrete time rounds, each node picks a neighbour uniformly at…
Ensuring security and integrity of elections constitutes an important challenge with wide-ranging societal implications. Classically, security guarantees can be ensured based on computational complexity, which may be challenged by quantum…