Related papers: Game Theoretic Consequences of Resident Matching
In most major cities and urban areas, residents form homogeneous neighborhoods along ethnic or socioeconomic lines. This phenomenon is widely known as residential segregation and has been studied extensively. Fifty years ago, Schelling…
In the real world, people/entities usually find matches independently and autonomously, such as finding jobs, partners, roommates, etc. It is possible that this search for matches starts with no initial knowledge of the environment. We…
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if…
We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…
The goal of this work was to apply the ``Gale-Shapley'' algorithm to a real-world problem. We analyzed the pairing of influencers with merchants, and after a detailed specification of the variables involved, we conducted experiments to…
Motivated by our collaboration with a major refugee resettlement agency in the U.S., we study a dynamic matching problem where each new arrival (a refugee case) must be matched immediately and irrevocably to one of the static resources (a…
This paper aims to provide insight into stability of collaboration choices in P2P networks. We study networks where exchanges between nodes are driven by the desire to receive the best service available. This is the case for most existing…
Gale and Sotomayor (1985) have shown that in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm (1962), the proposed-to side W (referred to as women there) can strategically force the W-optimal stable matching as the M-optimal one by truncating their…
This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and…
We present our experimental results of simulating the school choice problem which deals with the assignment of students to schools based on each group's complete preference list for the other group using two algorithms: Boston mechanism and…
On two-sided matching platforms such as online dating and recruiting, recommendation algorithms often aim to maximize the total number of matches. However, this objective creates an imbalance, where some users receive far too many matches…
The stable roommates problem is a non-bipartite version of the stable matching problem in a bipartite graph. In this paper, we consider the stable roommates problem with ties. In particular, we focus on strong stability, which is one of the…
We study the Stable Fixtures problem, a many-to-many generalisation of the classical non-bipartite Stable Roommates matching problem. Building on the foundational work of Tan on stable partitions, we extend his results to this significantly…
Resettlement agencies have started to adopt data-driven algorithmic matching to match refugees to locations using employment rate as a measure of utility. Given a pool of refugees, data-driven algorithmic matching utilizes a classifier to…
We initiate the study of distortion in stable matching. Concretely, we aim to design algorithms that have limited access to the agents' cardinal preferences and compute stable matchings of high quality with respect to some aggregate…
Most doctors in the NRMP are matched to one of their most-preferred internship programs. Since various surveys indicate similarities across doctors' preferences, this suggests a puzzle. How can nearly everyone get a position in a…
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC) is a generalisation of the classical Hospitals / Resident problem (HR) that is important in practical applications because it models the case where couples submit joint preference lists…
The efficient computation of large matchings with desirable guarantees is a crucial objective in market design. However, even in simple two-sided matching markets with weak ordinal preferences, finding a maximum-size stable matching is…
We consider a model for repeated stochastic matching where compatibility is probabilistic, is realized the first time agents are matched, and persists in the future. Such a model has applications in the gig economy, kidney exchange, and…
We consider the problem of computing popular matchings in a bipartite graph G = (R U H, E) where R and H denote a set of residents and a set of hospitals respectively. Each hospital h has a positive capacity denoting the number of residents…