Related papers: Implementability of Honest Multi-Agent Sequential …
As autonomous AI agents increasingly mediate online platform markets, a fundamental question emerges: do these markets generate stable strategic outcomes? In repeated strategic environments, the Nash equilibrium provides a natural benchmark…
In this paper the problem of optimal derivative design, profit maximization and risk minimization under adverse selection when multiple agencies compete for the business of a continuum of heterogenous agents is studied. The presence of ties…
We study Bayesian mechanism design problems in settings where agents have budgets. Specifically, an agent's utility for an outcome is given by his value for the outcome minus any payment he makes to the mechanism, as long as the payment is…
We consider a multiagent system consisting of selfish and heterogeneous agents. Its behavior is modeled by multipopulation replicator dynamics, where payoff functions of populations are different from each other. In general, there exist…
This work studies a dynamic mechanism design problem in which a principal delegates decision makings to a group of privately-informed agents without the monetary transfer or burning. We consider that the principal privately possesses…
The prevailing methodology for analyzing population games and evolutionary dynamics in the large population limit assumes that a Poisson process (or clock) inherent to each agent determines when the agent can revise its strategy. Hence,…
We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…
This tutorial article puts forth a framework to analyze the noncooperative strategic interactions among the members of a large population of bounded rationality agents. Our approach hinges on, unifies and generalizes existing methods and…
We study a setting in which a principal selects an agent to execute a collection of tasks according to a specified priority sequence. Agents, however, have their own individual priority sequences according to which they wish to execute the…
Logics for resource-bounded agents have been getting more and more attention in recent years since they provide us with more realistic tools for modelling and reasoning about multi-agent systems. While many existing approaches are based on…
In dynamic mechanism design literature, one critical aspect has been typically ignored-the agents' periodic participation, which they can adapt and plan strategically. We propose a framework for dynamic principal-multiagent problems,…
In a 2017 paper, later presented at the Web and Internet Economics conference, titled ``Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice", the authors propose a mechanism in which a series of agents, are tasked to negotiate over a set of decisions…
Routing strategies for traffics and vehicles have been historically studied. However, in the absence of considering drivers' preferences, current route planning algorithms are developed under ideal situations where all drivers are expected…
Social utility maximization refers to the process of allocating resources in such a way that the sum of agents' utilities is maximized under the system constraints. Such allocation arises in several problems in the general area of…
This paper studies the optimal mechanism to motivate effort in a dynamic principal-agent model without transfers. An agent is engaged in a task with uncertain future rewards and can quit at any time. The principal knows the reward and…
We study collaborative learning in multi-agent Bayesian bandit problems, where strategic agents collectively solve the same bandit instance. While multiple agents can accelerate learning by sharing information, strategic agents might prefer…
We study the problem of strategic choice of arrival time to a single-server queue with opening and closing times when there is uncertainty regarding service speed. A Poisson population of customers choose their arrival time with the goal of…
We examine the tuning of cooperative behavior in repeated multi-agent games using an analytically tractable, continuous-time, nonlinear model of opinion dynamics. Each modeled agent updates its real-valued opinion about each available…
We develop a scheme based on active learning to compute equilibria in a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). Specifically, an external observer (or entity), with little knowledge on the multi-agent process at hand, collects sensible…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…