Related papers: Constant payoff in absorbing games
In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…
We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…
In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…
We prove that to find optimal positional strategies for stochastic mean payoff games when the value of every state of the game is known, in general, is as hard as solving such games tout court. This answers a question posed by Daniel…
We investigate how well continuous-time fictitious play in two-player games performs in terms of average payoff, particularly compared to Nash equilibrium payoff. We show that in many games, fictitious play outperforms Nash equilibrium on…
This paper presents a payoff perturbation technique, introducing a strong convexity to players' payoff functions in games. This technique is specifically designed for first-order methods to achieve last-iterate convergence in games where…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
We study two-player zero-sum stopping games in continuous time and infinite horizon. We prove that the value in randomized stopping times exists as soon as the payoff processes are right-continuous. In particular, as opposed to existing…
A valuation for a player in a game in extensive form is an assignment of numeric values to the players moves. The valuation reflects the desirability moves. We assume a myopic player, who chooses a move with the highest valuation.…
We consider multi-player stopping games in continuous time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after all the players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy by observing other…
In this paper we provide formulas for the expectation of a conditional game duration in a finite state-space one-dimensional gambler's ruin problem with arbitrary winning $p(n)$ and losing $q(n)$ probabilities (i.e., they depend on the…
Once failure is irreversible, continuation payoffs cannot be meaningfully aggregated across strategies that differ in their survival properties. Standard scalar evaluation sidesteps this by arbitrarily completing payoffs beyond termination,…
We formulate a mean field game where each player stops a privately observed Brownian motion with absorption. Players are ranked according to their level of stopping and rewarded as a function of their relative rank. There is a unique mean…
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful mathematical framework to study how intelligent individuals adjust their strategies in collective interactions. It has been widely believed that it is impossible to unilaterally control players'…
We study nondeterministic strategies in parity games with the aim of computing a most permissive winning strategy. Following earlier work, we measure permissiveness in terms of the average number/weight of transitions blocked by the…
We develop value iteration-based algorithms to solve in a unified manner different classes of combinatorial zero-sum games with mean-payoff type rewards. These algorithms rely on an oracle, evaluating the dynamic programming operator up to…
We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…
Graph games provide the foundation for modeling and synthesizing reactive processes. In the synthesis of stochastic reactive processes, the traditional model is perfect-information stochastic games, where some transitions of the game graph…
This paper examines multiplayer symmetric constant-sum games with more than two players in a competitive setting, including examples like Mahjong, Poker, and various board and video games. In contrast to two-player zero-sum games,…
We introduce the concept of attainable sets of payoffs in two-player repeated games with vector payoffs. A set of payoff vectors is called {\em attainable} if player 1 can ensure that there is a finite horizon $T$ such that after time $T$…