Related papers: A Scalar Parameterized Mechanism for Two-Sided Mar…
Decentralized decision making in multi--product firms can lead to efficiency losses when autonomous decision makers fail to internalize cross--product demand interactions. This paper quantifies the magnitude of such losses by analyzing the…
We study the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of agents' utilities, in two well-known models. The first model involves one-sided preferences, where a set of indivisible items is allocated among a group…
We interpret multi-product supply chains (SCs) as coordinated markets; under this interpretation, a SC optimization problem is a market clearing problem that allocates resources and associated economic values (prices) to different…
Central results in economics guarantee the existence of efficient equilibria for various classes of markets. An underlying assumption in early work is that agents are price-takers, i.e., agents honestly report their true demand in response…
Social commerce platforms are emerging businesses where producers sell products through re-sellers who advertise the products to other customers in their social network. Due to the increasing popularity of this business model, thousands of…
This paper proposes a doubled-sided auction mechanism with price discrimination for social welfare (SW) maximization in the electricity and heating market. In this mechanism, energy service providers (ESPs) submit offers and load…
We model a system of n asymmetric firms selling a homogeneous good in a common market through a pay-as-bid auction. Every producer chooses as its strategy a supply function returning the quantity S(p) that it is willing to sell at a minimum…
We study a recommendation system where sellers compete for visibility by strategically offering commissions to a platform that optimally curates a ranked menu of items and their respective prices for each customer. Customers interact…
We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…
In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of buyers that have monetary endowments. While a Walrasian equilibrium does not always exist in this model, natural relaxations of the concept…
In the area of matching-based market design, existing models using cardinal utilities suffer from two deficiencies: First, the Hylland-Zeckhauser (HZ) mechanism, which has remained a classic in economics for one-sided matching markets, is…
We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [1] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders and for the public project problem, and in each case social welfare undominated mechanisms in the…
Entities in multi-agent systems may seek conflicting subobjectives, and this leads to competition between them. To address performance degradation due to competition, we consider a bi-level lottery where a social planner at the high level…
We consider an environment where sellers compete over buyers. All sellers are a-priori identical and strategically signal buyers about the product they sell. In a setting motivated by on-line advertising in display ad exchanges, where firms…
We study the price competition in a duopoly with an arbitrary number of buyers. Each seller can offer multiple units of a commodity depending on the availability of the commodity which is random and may be different for different sellers.…
In this paper, we study the Nash dynamics of strategic interplays of n buyers in a matching market setup by a seller, the market maker. Taking the standard market equilibrium approach, upon receiving submitted bid vectors from the buyers,…
We design novel mechanisms for welfare-maximization in two-sided markets. That is, there are buyers willing to purchase items and sellers holding items initially, both acting rationally and strategically in order to maximize utility. Our…
We model real-world data markets, where sellers post fixed prices and buyers are free to purchase from any set of sellers, as a simultaneous game. A key component here is the negative externality buyers induce on one another due to data…
Can noncooperative behaviour of merchants lead to a market split that prima facie seems anticompetitive? We introduce a model in which service providers, with ISPs being the main example, aim at optimizing the number of customers using…
Social utility maximization refers to the process of allocating resources in such a way that the sum of agents' utilities is maximized under the system constraints. Such allocation arises in several problems in the general area of…