Related papers: The Complexity of Contracts

This work studies the online contract design problem. The principal's goal is to learn the optimal contract that maximizes her utility through repeated interactions, without prior knowledge of the agent's type (i.e., the agent's cost and…

We consider a natural generalization of classical scheduling problems in which using a time unit for processing a job causes some time-dependent cost which must be paid in addition to the standard scheduling cost. We study the scheduling…

In this paper, we consider solving a composite optimization problem with coupling constraints in a multi-agent network based on proximal gradient method. In this problem, all the agents jointly minimize the sum of individual cost functions…

In this paper, we aim to solve a distributed optimization problem with affine coupling constraints in a multi-agent network, where the cost function of the agents is composed of smooth and possibly non-smooth parts. To solve this problem,…

In this work, we study sequential contracts under matroid constraints. In the sequential setting, an agent can take actions one by one. After each action, the agent observes the stochastic value of the action and then decides which action…

We consider a continuous time Principal-Agent model on a finite time horizon, where we look for the existence of an optimal contract both parties agreed on. Contrary to the main stream, where the principal is modelled as risk-neutral, we…

Principal agent games are a growing area of research which focuses on the optimal behaviour of a principal and an agent, with the former contracting work from the latter, in return for providing a monetary award. While this field…

We consider basic problems of non-preemptive scheduling on uniformly related machines. For a given schedule, defined by a partition of the jobs into m subsets corresponding to the m machines, C_i denotes the completion time of machine i.…

Constrained maximization of submodular functions poses a central problem in combinatorial optimization. In many realistic scenarios, a number of agents need to maximize multiple submodular objectives over the same ground set. We study such…

We study a setting in which a principal selects an agent to execute a collection of tasks according to a specified priority sequence. Agents, however, have their own individual priority sequences according to which they wish to execute the…

We study a multi-agent contracting problem where agents exert costly effort to achieve individually observable binary outcomes. While the principal can theoretically extract the full social welfare using a discriminatory contract that…

We consider a recently introduced fair repetitive scheduling problem involving a set of clients, each asking for their associated job to be daily scheduled on a single machine across a finite planning horizon. The goal is to determine a job…

We study classic scheduling problems on uniformly related machines. Efficient polynomial time approximation schemes (EPTAS's) are fast and practical approximation schemes. New methods and techniques are essential in developing such improved…

An agent holds a position in a perpetual contract with payoff function $\psi$ and attempts to liquidate the position while managing transaction costs, inventory risk, and funding rate payments. By solving the agent's stochastic control…

Adding a capacity constraint to a hidden-action principal-agent problem results in the same set of Pareto optimal contracts as the unconstrained problem where output is scaled down by a constant factor. This scaling factor is increasing in…

In recent years, the research of multi-agent systems has taken a direction to explore larger and more complex models to fulfill sophisticated tasks. We point out two possible pitfalls that might be caused by increasing complexity;…

We study an abstract optimal auction problem for a single good or service. This problem includes environments where agents have budgets, risk preferences, or multi-dimensional preferences over several possible configurations of the good…

This paper studies optimal contract design in private market investing, focusing on internal decision making in venture capital and private equity firms. A principal relies on an agent who privately exerts costly due diligence effort and…

This paper addresses the problem of collaboratively satisfying long-term spatial constraints in multi-agent systems. Each agent is subject to spatial constraints, expressed as inequalities, which may depend on the positions of other agents…

Researchers have demonstrated that neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples and subtle environment changes, both of which one can view as a form of distribution shift. To humans, the resulting errors can look like blunders,…