Related papers: Random horizon principal-agent problems
We present a continuous-time contract whereby a top-level player can incentivize a hierarchy of players below him to act in his best interest despite only observing the output of his direct subordinate. This paper extends Sannikov's…
This paper studies continuous-time optimal contracting in a hierarchy problem which generalises the model of Sung (2015). The hierarchy is modeled by a series of interlinked principal-agent problems, leading to a sequence of Stackelberg…
In this paper we address the problem of designing receding horizon control algorithms for linear discrete-time systems with parametric uncertainty. We do not consider presence of stochastic forcing or process noise in the system. It is…
In this paper we consider a principal agent problem where the agent is allowed to quit, by incurring a cost. When the current agent quits the job, the principal will hire a new one, possibly with a different type. We characterize the…
We present a dynamic programming-based solution to a stochastic optimal control problem up to a hitting time for a discrete-time Markov control process. Firstly, we determine an optimal control policy to steer the process toward a compact…
We consider the problem of simultaneous learning in stochastic games with many players in the finite-horizon setting. While the typical target solution for a stochastic game is a Nash equilibrium, this is intractable with many players. We…
Principal-agent problems model scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to take costly, unobservable actions through the provision of payments. Such problems are ubiquitous in several real-world applications, ranging from…
We consider the synthesis problem of a multi-agent system under signal temporal logic (STL) specifications representing bounded-time tasks that need to be satisfied recurrently over an infinite horizon. Motivated by the limited approaches…
We study a continuous time contracting model in which a principal hires a risk averse agent to manage a project over a finite horizon and provides sequential payments whose timing is endogenously determined. The resulting nonzero-sum…
We study a moral hazard problem with adverse selection: a risk-neutral agent can directly control the output distribution and possess private information about the production environment. The principal designs a menu of contracts satisfying…
We consider the infinite-horizon, average-reward restless bandit problem in discrete time. We propose a new class of policies that are designed to drive a progressively larger subset of arms toward the optimal distribution. We show that our…
This paper addresses a continuous-time contracting model that extends the problem introduced by Sannikov and later rigorously analysed by Possama\"{i} and Touzi. In our model, a principal hires a risk-averse agent to carry out a project.…
We study the classic principal-agent model when the signal observed by the principal is chosen by the agent. We fully characterize the optimal information structure from an agent's perspective in a general moral hazard setting with limited…
The solution of a constrained linear-quadratic regulator problem is determined by the set of its optimal active sets. We propose an algorithm that constructs this set of active sets for a desired horizon N from that for horizon N-1. While…
The Receding Horizon Control (RHC) strategy consists in replacing an infinite-horizon stabilization problem by a sequence of finite-horizon optimal control problems, which are numerically more tractable. The dynamic programming principle…
We study a class of infinite horizon impulse control problems with execution delay when the dynamics of the system is described by a general adapted stochastic process. The problem is solved by means of probabilistic tools relying on the…
We consider a contracting problem in which a principal hires an agent to manage a risky project. When the agent chooses volatility components of the output process and the principal observes the output continuously, the principal can…
This paper studies a continuous-time market {under stochastic environment} where an agent, having specified an investment horizon and a target terminal mean return, seeks to minimize the variance of the return with multiple stocks and a…
We provide a solution to the problem of receding horizon control for stochastic discrete-time systems with bounded control inputs and imperfect state measurements. For a suitable choice of control policies, we show that the finite-horizon…
A variety of problems in distributed control involve a networked system of autonomous agents cooperating to carry out some complex task in a decentralized fashion, e.g., orienting a flock of drones, or aggregating data from a network of…