Related papers: Hedonic Seat Arrangement Problems
In the recently introduced topological distance games, strategic agents need to be assigned to a subset of vertices of a topology. In the assignment, the utility of an agent depends on both the agent's inherent utilities for other agents…
We study the problem of assigning agents to the vertices of a graph such that no pair of neighbors can benefit from swapping assignments -- a property we term neighborhood stability. We further assume that agents' utilities are based solely…
This paper studies the performance of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) when the nodes, that form a Poisson point process, selfishly choose their Medium Access Probability (MAP). We consider goodput and delay as the performance metric that…
We study strategic network formation games in which agents attempt to form (costly) links in order to maximize their network centrality. Our model derives from Jackson and Wolinsky's symmetric connection model, but allows for heterogeneity…
An {\em arrangement} of an ordered pair $(G_A, G_M)$ of graphs is defined as a function $f$ from $V(G_A)$ to $V(G_M)$ such that, for each vertex $c$ of $G_M$, the vertex-set $f^{-1}(c)$ of $G_A$ either is $\emptyset$ (the case when $c…
We introduce a stochastic principal-agent model. A principal and an agent interact in a stochastic environment, each privy to observations about the state not available to the other. The principal has the power of commitment, both to elicit…
The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed and applied to many real-life application domains. As the theory has been applied to increasingly diverse types of environments, researchers and practitioners have encountered…
In this paper, we examine \emph{hedonic coalition formation games} in which each player's preferences over partitions of players depend only on the members of his coalition. We present three main results in which restrictions on the…
We initiate the study of computing envy-free allocations of indivisible items in the extension setting, i.e., when some part of the allocation is fixed and the task is to allocate the remaining items. Given the known NP-hardness of the…
We study the fair k-set selection problem where we aim to select $k$ sets from a given set system such that the (weighted) occurrence times that each element appears in these $k$ selected sets are balanced, i.e., the maximum (weighted)…
We study two stylized, multi-agent models aimed at investing a limited, indivisible resource in public transportation. In the first model, we face the decision of which potential stops to open along a (e.g., bus) path, given agents' travel…
The cost-sharing connection game is a variant of routing games on a network. In this model, given a directed graph with edge costs and edge capacities, each agent wants to construct a path from a source to a sink with low cost. The users…
The efficient and fair distribution of indivisible resources among agents is a common problem in the field of \emph{Multi-Agent-Systems}. We consider a graph-based version of this problem called Reachable Assignments, introduced by Gourves,…
We study a fair division setting in which participants are to be fairly distributed among teams, where not only do the teams have preferences over the participants as in the canonical fair division setting, but the participants also have…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible items on a path among agents. The objective is to find a fair and efficient allocation in which each agent's bundle forms a contiguous block on the line. We say that an instance is \emph{$(a,…
We study the multi-agent Smoothed Online Convex Optimization (SOCO) problem, where $N$ agents interact through a communication graph. In each round, each agent $i$ receives a strongly convex hitting cost function $f^i_t$ in an online…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. The extent of fairness of an allocation is measured by its Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of the valuations of the…
We consider a model of stable edge sets (``matchings'') in a bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ in which the preferences for vertices of one side (``firms'') are given via choice functions subject to standard axioms of consistency, substitutability…
We study the problem of finding fair allocations -- EF1 and EFX -- of indivisible goods with orientations. In an orientation, every agent gets items from their own predetermined set. For EF1, we show that EF1 orientations always exist when…
This paper explores the problem of fair assignment on Multi-Stage graphs. A multi-stage graph consists of nodes partitioned into $K$ disjoint sets (stages) structured as a sequence of weighted bipartite graphs formed across adjacent stages.…