Related papers: How Good Is a Strategy in a Game With Nature?

We construct several definitions of imbalance and playability, both of which are related to the existence of dominated strategies. Specifically, a maximally balanced game and a playable game cannot have dominated strategies for any player.…

Two-player zero-sum repeated games are well understood. Computing the value of such a game is straightforward. Additionally, if the payoffs are dependent on a random state of the game known to one, both, or neither of the players, the…

We compare games under delayed control and delay games, two types of infinite games modelling asynchronicity in reactive synthesis. Our main result, the interreducibility of the existence of sure winning strategies for the protagonist,…

The transitivity of preferences is one of the basic assumptions used in the theory of games and decisions. It is often equated with rationality of choice and is considered useful in building rankings. Intransitive preferences are considered…

One of the presuppositions of science since the times of Galileo, Newton, Laplace, and Descartes has been the predictability of the world. This idea has strongly influenced scientific and technological models. However, in recent decades,…

Decomposition methods are often used for producing counterfactual predictions in non-strategic settings. When the outcome of interest arises from a game-theoretic setting where agents are better off by deviating from their strategies after…

Can a problem undecidable with classical resources be decidable with quantum ones? The answer expected is no; as both being Turing theories, they should not solve the Halting problem - a problem unsolvable by any Turing machine. Yet, we…

In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner of the game. Such games are central in formal methods since they model the interaction between a…

We present a novel two-player game in a chaotic dynamical system where players have opposing objectives regarding the system's behavior. The game is analyzed using a methodology from the field of chaos control known as partial control. Our…

In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation…

This work is concerned with the rating of players/teams in face-to-face games with three possible outcomes: loss, win, and draw. This is one of the fundamental problems in sport analytics, where the very simple and popular, non-trivial…

We study infinite two-player games where one of the players is unsure about the set of moves available to the other player. In particular, the set of moves of the other player is a strict superset of what she assumes it to be. We explore…

We study the problem of learning classifiers robust to universal adversarial perturbations. While prior work approaches this problem via robust optimization, adversarial training, or input transformation, we instead phrase it as a…

From the standpoint of game theory, dominoes is a game that has not received much attention (specially the variety known as draw). It is usually thought that this game is already solved, given general results in game theory. However, the…

It is well known that artificial neural networks (ANNs) can learn deterministic automata. Learning nondeterministic automata is another matter. This is important because much of the world is nondeterministic, taking the form of…

This thesis presents some geometric insights into three different types of two player prediction games -- namely general learning task, prediction with expert advice, and online convex optimization. These games differ in the nature of the…

We study a random game in which two players in turn play a fixed number of moves. For each move, there are two possible choices. To each possible outcome of the game we assign a winner in an i.i.d. fashion with a fixed parameter p. In the…

We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve…

We study players interacting under the veil of ignorance, who have -- coarse -- beliefs represented as subsets of opponents' actions. We analyze when these players follow $\max \min$ or $\max\max$ decision criteria, which we identify with…

We consider a repeated sequential game between a learner, who plays first, and an opponent who responds to the chosen action. We seek to design strategies for the learner to successfully interact with the opponent. While most previous…