Related papers: VAT Compliance Incentives
Collaborative learning techniques have the potential to enable training machine learning models that are superior to models trained on a single entity's data. However, in many cases, potential participants in such collaborative schemes are…
Overcoming the impact of selfish behavior of rational players in multiagent systems is a fundamental problem in game theory. Without any intervention from a central agent, strategic users take actions in order to maximize their personal…
The classical setting of optimal control theory assumes full knowledge of the process dynamics and the costs associated with every control strategy. The problem becomes much harder if the controller only knows a finite set of possible…
In multiplayer games, self-interested behavior among the players can harm the social welfare. Tax mechanisms are a common method to alleviate this issue and induce socially optimal behavior. In this work, we take the initial step of…
This paper studies a two-player game with a quantitative surveillance requirement on an adversarial target moving in a discrete state space and a secondary objective to maximize short-term visibility of the environment. We impose the…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
We consider a refinement to the notions of collusion-resistance in transaction fee mechanisms. In particular, we require that the collusion is by itself incentive-compatible and individually rational to all of its participants. We then…
When modeling robot interactions as Nash equilibrium problems, it is desirable to place coupled constraints which restrict these interactions to be safe and acceptable (for instance, to avoid collisions). Such games are continuous with…
Incentivizing the existing participants to invite new participants to join an auction, matching or cooperative game have been extensively studied recently. One common challenge to design such incentive in these games is that the invitees…
Pursuit-evasion games are ubiquitous in nature and in an artificial world. In nature, pursuer(s) and evader(s) are intelligent agents that can learn from experience, and dynamics (i.e., Newtonian or Lagrangian) is vital for the pursuer and…
Tournament organisers supposedly design rules such that a team cannot be strictly better off by exerting a lower effort. However, the European qualification tournaments for recent FIFA soccer World Cups are known to violate this…
Modeling the decision-making behavior of vehicles presents unique challenges, particularly during unprotected left turns at intersections, where the uncertainty of human drivers is especially pronounced. In this context, connected…
We consider a game-theoretic model where individuals compete over a shared failure-prone system or resource. We investigate the effectiveness of a taxation mechanism in controlling the utilization of the resource at the Nash equilibrium…
Incomplete cooperative games generalise the classical model of cooperative games by omitting the values of some of the coalitions. This allows to incorporate uncertainty into the model and study the underlying games as well as possible…
In dynamic settings each economic agent's choices can be revealing of her private information. This elicitation via the rationalization of observable behavior depends each agent's perception of which payoff-relevant contingencies other…
We propose a decentralized solution for a pursuit-evasion game involving a heterogeneous group of rational (selfish) pursuers and a single evader based on the framework of potential games. In the proposed game, the evader aims to delay (or,…
To address the safety and efficiency issues of vehicles at multi-lane merging zones, a cooperative decision-making framework is designed for connected automated vehicles (CAVs) using a coalitional game approach. Firstly, a motion prediction…
In this paper we introduce and analyse, from a game theoretical perspective, several multi-agent or multi-item continuous review inventory models in which the buyers are exempted from ordering costs if the price of their orders is greater…
In this work we study the problem of tax evasion on a fully-connected population. For this purpose, we consider that the agents may be in three different states, namely honest tax payers, tax evaders and undecided, that are individuals in…
A game theory inspired methodology is proposed for finding a function's saddle points. While explicit descent methods are known to have severe convergence issues, implicit methods are natural in an adversarial setting, as they take the…