Related papers: Learning Zero-Sum Simultaneous-Move Markov Games U…

Zero-sum Markov Stackelberg games can be used to model myriad problems, in domains ranging from economics to human robot interaction. In this paper, we develop policy gradient methods that solve these games in continuous state and action…

The problem of two-player zero-sum Markov games has recently attracted increasing interests in theoretical studies of multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL). In particular, for finite-horizon episodic Markov decision processes (MDPs), it…

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from…

We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…

Regret minimization is a general approach to online optimization which plays a crucial role in many algorithms for approximating Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. The literature mainly focuses on solving individual games in…

The sim-to-real gap, where agents trained in a simulator face significant performance degradation during testing, is a fundamental challenge in reinforcement learning. Extansive works adopt the framework of distributionally robust RL, to…

There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games. While…

Characterizing the performance of no-regret dynamics in multi-player games is a foundational problem at the interface of online learning and game theory. Recent results have revealed that when all players adopt specific learning algorithms,…

We examine online safe multi-agent reinforcement learning using constrained Markov games in which agents compete by maximizing their expected total rewards under a constraint on expected total utilities. Our focus is confined to an episodic…

We study discrete-time mean-field Markov games with infinite numbers of agents where each agent aims to minimize its ergodic cost. We consider the setting where the agents have identical linear state transitions and quadratic cost…

A celebrated connection in the interface of online learning and game theory establishes that players minimizing swap regret converge to correlated equilibria (CE) -- a seminal game-theoretic solution concept. Despite the long history of…

We initiate the study of how to perturb the reward in a zero-sum Markov game with two players to induce a desirable Nash equilibrium, namely arbitrating. Such a problem admits a bi-level optimization formulation. The lower level requires…

We consider two-player zero-sum stochastic games and propose a two-timescale $Q$-learning algorithm with function approximation that is payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. In two-timescale…

A significant roadblock to the development of principled multi-agent reinforcement learning is the fact that desired solution concepts like Nash equilibria may be intractable to compute. To overcome this obstacle, we take inspiration from…

Zero-sum games arise in a wide variety of problems, including robust optimization and adversarial learning. However, algorithms deployed for finding a local Nash equilibrium in these games often converge to non-Nash stationary points. This…

We revisit the problem of learning in two-player zero-sum Markov games, focusing on developing an algorithm that is uncoupled, convergent, and rational, with non-asymptotic convergence rates. We start from the case of stateless matrix game…

Multi-agent reinforcement learning has made substantial empirical progresses in solving games with a large number of players. However, theoretically, the best known sample complexity for finding a Nash equilibrium in general-sum games…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to…

We revisit the problem of solving two-player zero-sum games in the decentralized setting. We propose a simple algorithmic framework that simultaneously achieves the best rates for honest regret as well as adversarial regret, and in addition…

We study a new class of Markov games, \emph(multi-player) zero-sum Markov Games} with \emph{Networked separable interactions} (zero-sum NMGs), to model the local interaction structure in non-cooperative multi-agent sequential…