Related papers: A mean-field analysis of two-player zero-sum games
We consider the problem of computing a mixed-strategy generalized Nash equilibrium (MS-GNE) for a class of games where each agent has both continuous and integer decision variables. Specifically, we propose a novel Bregman…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
The theory of mean field games is a tool to understand noncooperative dynamic stochastic games with a large number of players. Much of the theory has evolved under conditions ensuring uniqueness of the mean field game Nash equilibrium.…
Solution methods for generalized Nash equilibrium have been dominated by variational inequalities and complementarity problems. Since these approaches fundamentally rely on the sufficiency of first-order optimality conditions for the…
We consider the problem of finding Nash equilibrium for two-player turn-based zero-sum games. Inspired by the AlphaGo Zero (AGZ) algorithm, we develop a Reinforcement Learning based approach. Specifically, we propose…
We consider a variant of the hide-and-seek game in which a seeker inspects multiple hiding locations to find multiple items hidden by a hider. Each hiding location has a maximum hiding capacity and a probability of detecting its hidden…
We study reinforcement learning for two-player zero-sum Markov games with simultaneous moves in the finite-horizon setting, where the transition kernel of the underlying Markov games can be parameterized by a linear function over the…
Learning in games considers how multiple agents maximize their own rewards through repeated games. Memory, an ability that an agent changes his/her action depending on the history of actions in previous games, is often introduced into…
In the context of large population symmetric games, approximate Nash equilibria are introduced through equilibrium solutions of the corresponding mean field game in the sense that the individual gain from optimal unilateral deviation under…
We consider learning Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum Markov Games with nonlinear function approximation, where the action-value function is approximated by a function in a Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS). The key challenge is…
Many emerging applications - such as adversarial training, AI alignment, and robust optimization - can be framed as zero-sum games between neural nets, with von Neumann-Nash equilibria (NE) capturing the desirable system behavior. While…
We consider a symmetric $n$-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with controlled jumps and mean-field type interaction among the players. Each player minimizes some expected cost by affecting the drift as well as the jump part of…
We study $n$-agent Bayesian Games with $m$-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called Linear Multidimensional Bayesian Games. This class of games is equivalent with $n$-agent, $m$-game Uniform Multigames. We distinguish…
In this paper we present a novel generic mapping between Graphical Games and Markov Random Fields so that pure Nash equilibria in the former can be found by statistical inference on the latter. Thus, the problem of deciding whether a…
AI in Math deals with mathematics in a constructive manner so that reasoning becomes automated, less laborious, and less error-prone. For algorithms, the question becomes how to automate analyses for specific problems. For the first time,…
We design the first fully-distributed algorithm for generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games on a time-varying communication network, under partial-decision information, i.e., the agents have no direct access to the…
In this paper, we investigate a class of mean field games where the mean field interactions are achieved through the joint (conditional) distribution of the controlled state and the control process. The strategies are of $open\;loop$ type,…
This paper explores aggregative games in a network of general linear systems subject to external disturbances. To deal with external disturbances, distributed strategy-updating rules based on internal model are proposed for the case with…
We consider the problem of computing stationary points in min-max optimization, with a particular focus on the special case of computing Nash equilibria in (two-)team zero-sum games. We first show that computing $\epsilon$-Nash equilibria…
In this tutorial, we provide an introduction to machine learning methods for finding Nash equilibria in games with large number of agents. These types of problems are important for the operations research community because of their…