Related papers: Sensitivity of Wardrop Equilibria: Revisited
We apply renormalized entropy as a complexity measure to the logistic and sine-circle maps. In the case of logistic map, renormalized entropy decreases (increases) until the accumulation point (after the accumulation point up to the most…
The demand for resilient logistics networks has increased because of recent disasters. When we consider optimization problems, entropy regularization is a powerful tool for the diversification of a solution. In this study, we proposed a…
We develop bounds on the capacity of wireless networks when the traffic is non-uniform, i.e., not all nodes are required to receive and send similar volumes of traffic. Our results are asymptotic, i.e., they hold with probability going to…
We study the classic single-choice prophet inequality problem through a resource augmentation lens. Our goal is to bound the $(1-\varepsilon)$-competition complexity of different types of online algorithms. This metric asks for the smallest…
The price of anarchy (PoA) is a popular metric for analyzing the inefficiency of self-interested decision making. Although its study is widespread, characterizing the PoA can be challenging. A commonly employed approach is based on the…
We consider the problem of determining asymptotic bounds on the capacity of a random ad hoc network. Previous approaches assumed a link layer model in which if a transmitter-receiver pair can communicate with each other, i.e., the Signal to…
We show that a large effective number of commodities can be a source of equilibrium stability and uniqueness: expanding substitution opportunities strengthens aggregate substitution effects. We study finite dated-commodity exchange…
A new simple model of diffusion of innovations in a social network with upgrading costs is introduced. Agents are characterized by a single real variable, their technological level. According to local information agents decide whether to…
We study the price of anarchy of mechanisms in the presence of risk-averse agents. Previous work has focused on agents with quasilinear utilities, possibly with a budget. Our model subsumes this as a special case but also captures that…
We revisit the linear Cournot model with uncertain demand that is studied in Lagerl\"of (2006)* and provide sufficient conditions for equilibrium uniqueness that complement the existing results. We show that if the distribution of the…
Pricing algorithms have demonstrated the capability to learn tacit collusion that is largely unaddressed by current regulations. Their increasing use in markets, including oligopolistic industries with a history of collusion, calls for…
Congestion games constitute an important class of non-cooperative games which was introduced by Rosenthal in 1973. In recent years, several extensions of these games were proposed to incorporate aspects that are not captured by the standard…
Price controls kill the incentive for arbitrage. We prove a Chaos Theorem: under a binding price ceiling, suppliers are indifferent across destinations, so arbitrarily small cost differences can determine the entire allocation. The economy…
In many markets, like electricity or cloud computing markets, providers incur large costs for keeping sufficient capacity in reserve to accommodate demand fluctuations of a mostly fixed user base. These costs are significantly affected by…
We introduce an agent-based model, in which agents set their prices to maximize profit. At steady state the market self-organizes into three groups: excess producers, consumers and balanced agents, with prices determined by their own…
We consider processing networks where multiple dispatchers are connected to single-server queues by a bipartite compatibility graph, modeling constraints that are common in data centers and cloud networks due to geographic reasons or data…
We provide an upper bound on the quasi-relative entropy in terms of the trace distance. The bound is derived for two cases: 1) any operator monotone decreasing function and full rank mixed qubit or classical states; 2) a large class of…
Identical products being sold at different prices in different locations is a common phenomenon. Price differences might occur due to various reasons such as shipping costs, trade restrictions and price discrimination. To model such…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
In this paper we show that the price of stability of Shapley network design games on undirected graphs with k players is at most (k^3(k+1)/2-k^2) / (1+k^3(k+1)/2-k^2) H_k = (1 - \Theta(1/k^4)) H_k, where H_k denotes the k-th harmonic…