Related papers: All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…
The Maker Protocol is a decentralized finance application that enables collateralized lending. The application uses open-bid, second-price auctions to complete its loan liquidation process. In this paper, we develop a bidding function for…
We study an auction setting in which bidders bid for placement of their content within a summary generated by a large language model (LLM), e.g., an ad auction in which the display is a summary paragraph of multiple ads. This generalizes…
In repeated games, such as auctions, players rely on autonomous learning agents to choose their actions. We study settings in which players have their agents make monetary transfers to other agents during play at their own expense, in order…
Online advertising banners are sold in real-time through auctions.Typically, the more banners a user is shown, the smaller the marginalvalue of the next banner for this user is. This fact can be detected bybasic ML models, that can be used…
Auto-bidding has become one of the main options for bidding in online advertisements, in which advertisers only need to specify high-level objectives and leave the complex task of bidding to auto-bidders. In this paper, we propose a family…
In a multiple-object auction, every bidder tries to win as many objects as possible with a bidding algorithm. This paper studies position-randomized auctions, which form a special class of multiple-object auctions where a bidding algorithm…
In digital goods auctions, there is an auctioneer who sells an item with unlimited supply to a set of potential buyers, and the objective is to design truthful auction to maximize the total profit of the auctioneer. Motivated from an…
Bidding strategies that help advertisers determine bidding prices are receiving increasing attention as more and more ad impressions are sold through real-time bidding systems. This paper first describes the problem and challenges of…
This paper examines knapsack auctions as a method to solve the knapsack problem with incomplete information, where object values are private and sizes are public. We analyze three auction types-uniform price (UP), discriminatory price (DP),…
Sponsored search becomes an easy platform to match potential consumers' intent with merchants' advertising. Advertisers express their willingness to pay for each keyword in terms of bids to the search engine. When a user's query matches the…
We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to enter. Unlike all-pay auctions where a usual design objective…
Motivated by Carbon Emissions Trading Schemes, Treasury Auctions, Procurement Auctions, and Wholesale Electricity Markets, which all involve the auctioning of homogeneous multiple units, we consider the problem of learning how to bid in…
We analyze the problem of how to optimally bid for ad spaces in online ad auctions. For this we consider the general case of multiple ad campaigns with overlapping targeting criteria. In our analysis we first characterize the structure of…
In first-price auctions for display advertising, exchanges typically communicate the "minimum-bid-to-win" to bidders after the auction as feedback for their bidding algorithms. For a winner, this is the second-highest bid, while for losing…
Algorithms increasingly automate bidding in online auctions, raising concerns about tacit bid suppression and revenue shortfalls. Prior work identifies individual mechanisms behind algorithmic bid suppression, but it remains unclear which…
We study the problem of learning to bid when the bidder's value is dynamic, i.e., when the current value depends on past outcomes. Specifically, we consider a bidder participating in repeated second-price auctions whose value depends on the…
Innovative auction methods can be exploited to increase profits, with Shubik's famous "dollar auction" perhaps being the most widely known example. Recently, some mainstream e-commerce web sites have apparently achieved the same end on a…
In markets such as digital advertising auctions, bidders want to maximize value rather than payoff. This is different to the utility functions typically assumed in auction theory and leads to different strategies and outcomes. We refer to…
This paper describes a study of agent bidding strategies, assuming combinatorial valuations for complementary and substitutable goods, in three auction environments: sequential auctions, simultaneous auctions, and the Trading Agent…