Related papers: Local Aggregation in Preference Games

The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…

In single-agent Markov decision processes, an agent can optimize its policy based on the interaction with environment. In multi-player Markov games (MGs), however, the interaction is non-stationary due to the behaviors of other players, so…

We consider strategic games that are inspired by Schelling's model of residential segregation. In our model, the agents are partitioned into k types and need to select locations on an undirected graph. Agents can be either stubborn, in…

Bolletta (2021, Math. Soc. Sci. 114:1-10) studies a model in which a network is strategically formed and then agents play a linear best-response investment game in it. The model is motivated by an application in which people choose both…

Federated learning offers a decentralized approach to machine learning, where multiple agents collaboratively train a model while preserving data privacy. In this paper, we investigate the decision-making and equilibrium behavior in…

In network formation games, agents form edges with each other to maximize their utility. Each agent's utility depends on its private beliefs and its edges in the network. Strategic agents can misrepresent their beliefs to get a better…

We study the dynamics of the Naming Game [Baronchelli et al., (2006) J. Stat. Mech.: Theory Exp. P06014] in empirical social networks. This stylized agent-based model captures essential features of agreement dynamics in a network of…

We analyze the accuracy of collective decision-making in socially connected populations, where agents update binary choices through local interactions on a network. Each agent receives a private signal that is biased -- even marginally --…

Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…

Today we rely on networks that are created and maintained by smart devices. For such networks, there is no governing central authority but instead the network structure is shaped by the decisions of selfish intelligent agents. A key…

We propose a model of opinion formation on resource allocation among multiple topics by multiple agents, who are subject to hard budget constraints. We define a utility function for each agent and then derive a projected dynamical system…

In this paper, we present a framework for multi-agent learning in a nonstationary dynamic network environment. More specifically, we examine projected gradient play in smooth monotone repeated network games in which the agents'…

In this paper we study resource allocation in decentralized information local public good networks. A network is a local public good network if each user's actions directly affect the utility of an arbitrary subset of network users. We…

We consider a class of Nash games, termed as aggregative games, being played over a networked system. In an aggregative game, a player's objective is a function of the aggregate of all the players' decisions. Every player maintains an…

This paper investigates Nash equilibria (NEs) in multi-player turn-based games on graphs, where player preferences are modeled as $\omega$-automatic relations via deterministic parity automata. Unlike much of the existing literature, which…

We consider a strategic network quantizer design setting where agents must balance fidelity in representing their local source distributions against their ability to successfully communicate with other connected agents. We study the problem…

This paper addresses information-based sensing point selection from a set of possible sensing locations, which determines a set of measurement points maximizing the mutual information between the sensor measurements and the variables of…

A social choice procedure is modeled as a repeated Nash game between the social agents, who are communicating with each other through a social communication network modeled by an undirected graph. The agents' criteria for this game are…

We examine settings in which agents choose behaviors and care about their neighbors' behaviors, but have incomplete information about the network in which they are embedded. We develop a model in which agents use local knowledge of their…

Network games provide a natural machinery to compactly represent strategic interactions among agents whose payoffs exhibit sparsity in their dependence on the actions of others. Besides encoding interaction sparsity, however, real networks…