Related papers: Dynamics of extended Schelling models
Schelling games model the wide-spread phenomenon of residential segregation in metropolitan areas from a game-theoretic point of view. In these games agents of different types each strategically select a node on a given graph that models…
We investigate a social system of agents faced with a binary choice. We assume there is a correct, or beneficial, outcome of this choice. Furthermore, we assume agents are influenced by others in making their decision, and that the agents…
Schelling segregation is a well-established model used to investigate the dynamics of segregation in agent-based models. Since we consider segregation to be key for the development of political polarisation, we are interested in what…
In Schelling's segregation model, the successive moves of agents optimizing their own locations lead to a suboptimal segregated distribution of the population, even though all agents have the same preference for mixed neighborhoods. One of…
Residential segregation is analyzed via the Schelling model, in which two types of agents attempt to optimize their situation according to certain preferences and tolerance levels. Several variants of this work are focused on urban or…
The Schelling model of segregation was introduced in economics to show how micro-motives can influence macro-behavior. Agents on a lattice have two colors and try to move to a different location if the number of their neighbors with a…
We model the dynamics of the Schelling model for agents described simply by a continuously distributed variable - wealth. Agents move to neighborhoods where their wealth is not lesser than that of some proportion of their neighbors, the…
We introduce the class of modified Schelling games in which there are different types of agents who occupy the nodes of a location graph; agents of the same type are friends, and agents of different types are enemies. Every agent is…
We consider the constrained Schelling model of social segregation in which the utility factor of agents strictly increases and non-local jumps of the agents are allowed. In the present study, the utility factor u is defined in a way such…
One of the earliest agent-based economical models, Schelling's spacial proximity model illustrated how global segregation can emerge, often unwanted, from the actions of agents of two races acting in accordance with their individual local…
Residential segregation in metropolitan areas is a phenomenon that can be observed all over the world. Recently, this was investigated via game-theoretic models. There, selfish agents of two types are equipped with a monotone utility…
A simple queueing approach for segregation of agents in modified one dimensional Schelling segregation model is presented. The goal is to arrive at simple formula for the number of unhappy agents remaining after the segregation.
In Schelling's segregation model agents of two ethnic groups reside in a regular grid and aim to live in a neighborhood that matches the minimum desired fraction of members of the same ethnicity. The model shows that observed segregation…
Axelrod's model for the dissemination of culture combines two key ingredients of social dynamics: social influence, through which people become more similar when they interact, and homophily, which is the tendency of individuals to interact…
We propose an opinion model based on agents located at the vertices of a regular lattice. Each agent has an independent opinion (among an arbitrary, but fixed, number of choices) and its own degree of conviction. The latter changes every…
This study employs gamified experiments to investigate and refine the Schelling Model of Segregation, a framework that demonstrates how individual preferences can lead to systemic segregation. Using a movement selection algorithm derived…
We model the dynamics of social structure by a simple interacting particle system. The social standing of an individual agent is represented by an integer-valued fitness that changes via two offsetting processes. When two agents interact…
We investigate the Schelling model of social segregation, formulated as an intrinsically non-equilibrium system, in which the agents occupy districts (or patches) rather than sites on a grid. We show that this allows the equations governing…
We consider an agent-based model in which two types of agents interact locally over a graph and have a common intolerance threshold $\tau$ for changing their types with exponentially distributed waiting times. The model is equivalent to an…
We consider Schelling's bounded neighbourhood model (BNM) of unorganised segregation of two populations from the perspective of modern dynamical systems theory. We derive a Schelling dynamical system and carry out a complete quantitative…