Related papers: Strategy-Proof Spectrum Allocation among Multiple …
To address the demand of exponentially increasing end users efficient use of limited spectrum is a necessity. For this, spectrum allocation among co-existing operators in licensed and unlicensed spectrum band is required to cater to the…
Secondary spectrum auction is widely applied in wireless networks for mitigating the spectrum scarcity. In a realistic spectrum trading market, the requests from secondary users often specify the usage of a fixed spectrum frequency band in…
This article introduces a new approach to address the spectrum scarcity challenge in 6G networks by implementing the enhanced licensed shared access (ELSA) framework. Our proposed auction mechanism aims to ensure fairness in spectrum…
We propose a physics-grounded mechanism design for dynamic spectrum sharing that bridges the gap between radiometric retrieval constraints and economic incentives. We formulate the active and passive users coexistence problem as a…
Efficient and fair spectrum allocation is a central challenge in 6G networks, where massive connectivity and heterogeneous services continuously compete for limited radio resources. We investigate the use of Large Language Models (LLMs) as…
Many network resource allocation problems can be viewed as allocating a divisible resource, where the allocations are constrained to lie in a polymatroid. We consider market-based mechanisms for such problems. Though the…
Vehicular cloud computing has emerged as a promising solution to fulfill users' demands on processing computation-intensive applications in modern driving environments. Such applications are commonly represented by graphs consisting of…
Device-to-Device communication allows a cellular user (relay node) to relay data between the base station (BS) and another cellular user (destination node). We address the problem of designing reverse auctions to assign a relay node to each…
This paper is about allocation of an infinitely divisible good to several rational and strategic agents. The allocation is done by a social planner who has limited information because the agents' valuation functions are taken to be private…
This paper studies multi-unit auctions powered by intermediaries, where each intermediary owns a private set of unit-demand buyers and all intermediaries are networked with each other. Our goal is to incentivize the intermediaries to…
In this paper, we present a quality of service (QoS)-aware priority-based spectrum management scheme to guarantee the minimum required bit rate of vertical sector players (VSPs) in the 5G and beyond generation, including the 6th generation…
In this paper, we design and develop a pricing model applicable to strategy proof pricing. To provide an economic stability towards its consumers. The economic model we use is Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). By this each service provider has…
We evaluate the applicability of the generic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism as an antimonopoly measure against a profit-maximizing producer with market power operating a portfolio of generating units at the centralized two-settlement…
Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, coalitions of participants can influence the auction outcome to obtain higher collective profit. These manipulations were proven to be eliminated if and only if the market…
Control reserves are power generation or consumption entities that ensure balance of supply and demand of electricity in real-time. In many countries, they are operated through a market mechanism in which entities provide bids. The system…
We propose a novel statistical learning method for multi-item auctions that incorporates credible intervals. Our approach employs nonparametric density estimation to estimate credible intervals for bidder types based on historical data. We…
In this paper, we assess the applicability of auctions based on the Vickrey second price model for allocating wireless spectrum in developing countries. We first provide an overview of auction models for allocating resources. We then…
In this paper, we propose a novel sealed-bid auction framework to address the problem of dynamic spectrum allocation in cognitive radio (CR) networks. We design an optimal auction mechanism that maximizes the moderator's expected utility,…
The classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism ensures incentive compatibility, i.e., that truth-telling of all agents is a dominant strategy, for a static one-shot game. However, in a dynamic environment that unfolds over time, the…
Network utility maximization (NUM) is a general framework for designing distributed optimization algorithms for large-scale networks. An economic challenge arises in the presence of strategic agents' private information. Existing studies…