Related papers: Incentive-Compatible Diffusion Auctions
In economics, there are many ways to describe the interaction between a "seller" and a "buyer". The most common one, with which we interact almost every day, is selling for a fixed price. This option is perfect for selling a mass product,…
Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired subset of the goods. Auction theory provides little guidance for dealing with this…
The auction theory literature has so far focused mostly on the design of mechanisms that takes the revenue or the efficiency as a yardstick. However, scenarios where the {\it capacity}, which we define as \textit{``the number of bidders the…
This paper studies the incentives of the seller and buyers to shill bid in a single-item auction. An auction is seller identity-compatible if the seller cannot profit from pretending to be one or more bidders via fake identities. It is…
Generating good revenue is one of the most important problems in Bayesian auction design, and many (approximately) optimal dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) Bayesian mechanisms have been constructed for various auction settings.…
Diffusion models have become popular for policy learning in robotics due to their ability to capture high-dimensional and multimodal distributions. However, diffusion policies are stochastic and typically trained offline, limiting their…
This paper studies a wireless network where multiple users cooperate with each other to improve the overall network performance. Our goal is to design an optimal distributed power allocation algorithm that enables user cooperation, in…
We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategyproof…
A seller is selling a pair of divisible complementary goods to an agent. The agent consumes the goods only in a specific ratio and freely disposes of excess in either goods. The value of the bundle and the ratio are private information of…
We consider a fixed-price mechanism design setting where a seller sells one item via a social network, but the seller can only directly communicate with her neighbours initially. Each other node in the network is a potential buyer with a…
From social networks to supply chains, more and more aspects of how humans, firms and organizations interact is mediated by artificial learning agents. As the influence of machine learning systems grows, it is paramount that we study how to…
The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good mechanisms for risk-averse sellers. As is standard in the…
Our work bridges the literature on incentive-compatible mechanism design and the literature on diffusion algorithms. We introduce the study of finding an incentive-compatible (strategy-proof) mechanism for selecting an influential vertex in…
This paper studies optimal auction design when valuations depend endogenously on post-auction collaboration between the seller and the winning bidder. Both parties exert non-contractible efforts after the auction, generating a double moral…
Incentivizing the existing participants to invite new participants to join an auction, matching or cooperative game have been extensively studied recently. One common challenge to design such incentive in these games is that the invitees…
We are interested in the setting where a seller sells sequentially arriving items, one per period, via a dynamic auction. At the beginning of each period, each buyer draws a private valuation for the item to be sold in that period and this…
As computational agents are developed for increasingly complicated e-commerce applications, the complexity of the decisions they face demands advances in artificial intelligence techniques. For example, an agent representing a seller in an…
Identifying high-revenue mechanisms that are both dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational (IR) is a fundamental challenge in auction design. While theoretical approaches have encountered bottlenecks in…
We study the problem of achieving high efficiency in iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs). ICAs are a kind of combinatorial auction where the auctioneer interacts with bidders to gather their valuation information using a limited number…
In diffusion auctions, sellers can leverage an underlying social network to broaden participation, thereby increasing their potential revenue. Specifically, sellers can incentivise participants in their auction to diffuse information about…