Related papers: Permissioned Blockchain Revisited: A Byzantine Gam…
This position paper presents a synthesis viewpoint of blockchains from two orthogonal perspectives: fault-tolerant distributed systems and game theory. Specifically, we formulate a new game-theoretical problem in the context of blockchains…
In this paper we analyze from the game theory point of view Byzantine Fault Tolerant blockchains when processes exhibit rational or Byzantine behavior. Our work is the first to model the Byzantine-consensus based blockchains as a committee…
Blockchain protocols typically aspire to run in the permissionless setting, in which nodes are owned and operated by a large number of diverse and unknown entities, with each node free to start or stop running the protocol at any time. This…
We study game-theoretic models for capturing participation in blockchain systems. Permissionless blockchains can be naturally viewed as games, where a set of potentially interested users is faced with the dilemma of whether to engage with…
The blockchain concept forms the backbone of a new wave technology that promises to be deployed extensively in a wide variety of industrial and societal applications. Governments, financial institutions, banks, industrial supply chains,…
Byzantine agreement, the underlying core of blockchain, aims to make every node in a decentralized network reach consensus. Classical Byzantine agreements unavoidably face two major problems. One is $1/3$ fault-tolerance bound, which means…
In 2015, Eyal proposed the first game-theoretical model for analyzing the equilibrium of blockchain pooling: when the blockchain pools are abstracted as a non-cooperative game, two pools can reach a Nash equilibrium with a closed-form…
Cooperation is fundamental for human prosperity. Blockchain, as a trust machine, is a cooperative institution in cyberspace that supports cooperation through distributed trust with consensus protocols. While studies in computer science…
It is impossible to solve the Byzantine consensus problem in an open network of $n$ participants if only $2n/3$ or less of them are correct. As blockchains need to solve consensus, one might think that blockchains need more than $2n/3$…
This paper presents a novel solution concept, called BAR Nash Equilibrium (BARNE) and apply it to analyse the Verifier's dilemma, a fundamental problem in blockchain. Our solution concept adapts the Nash equilibrium (NE) to accommodate…
Byzantine general problem is the core problem of the consensus algorithm, and many protocols are proposed recently to improve the decentralization level, the performance and the security of the blockchain. There are two challenging issues…
Blockchains rely on economic incentives to ensure secure and decentralised operation, making incentive compatibility a core design concern. However, protocols are rarely deployed in isolation. Applications interact with the underlying…
Blockchain technology offers a decentralized and secure method for storing and authenticating data, rendering it well-suited for various applications such as digital currencies, supply chain management, and voting systems. However, the…
Blockchain systems benefit from lessons in prior art such as fault tolerance, distributed systems, peer-to-peer systems, and game theory. In this paper we argue that blockchain algorithms should tolerate both rational (self-interested)…
This paper addresses the challenge of solving the generalized Nash Equilibrium seeking problem for decentralized stochastic online multi-cluster games amidst Byzantine agents. During the game process, each honest agent is influenced by both…
We propose a model for games in which the players have shared access to a blockchain that allows them to deploy smart contracts to act on their behalf. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract…
We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…
Consensus protocols have traditionally been studied in a setting where all participants are known to each other from the start of the protocol execution. In the parlance of the 'blockchain' literature, this is referred to as the…
Blockchain games introduce unique gameplay and incentive mechanisms by allowing players to be rewarded with in-game assets or tokens through financial activities. However, most blockchain games are not comparable to traditional games in…
We develop a model of coordination and allocation of decentralized multi-sided markets, in which our theoretical analysis is promisingly optimizing the decentralized transaction packaging process at high-throughput blockchains or Web 3.0…