Related papers: Behavioral and Game-Theoretic Security Investments…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
Firms in inter-organizational networks such as supply chains or strategic alliances are exposed to interdependent risks. These are risks that are transferable across partner firms. They can be decomposed into intrinsic risks a firm faces…
Game theory has been applied to investigate network security. But different security scenarios were often modeled via different types of games and analyzed in an ad-hoc manner. In this paper, we propose an algebraic approach for modeling…
The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of…
Strategic network formation arises where agents receive benefit from connections to other agents, but also incur costs for forming links. We consider a new network formation game that incorporates an adversarial attack, as well as…
Stochastic patrol routing is known to be advantageous in adversarial settings; however, the optimal choice of stochastic routing strategy is dependent on a model of the adversary. We adopt a worst-case omniscient adversary model from the…
This paper considers the problem of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in aggregative games, where the payoff function of each player depends on an aggregate of all players' actions. We present a distributed continuous time algorithm such that…
Designing optimal interdependent networks is important for the robustness and efficiency of national critical infrastructures. Here, we establish a two-person game-theoretic model in which two network designers choose to maximize the global…
We consider a two-player network inspection game, in which a defender allocates sensors with potentially heterogeneous detection capabilities in order to detect multiple attacks caused by a strategic attacker. The objective of the defender…
Distributed Support Vector Machines (DSVM) have been developed to solve large-scale classification problems in networked systems with a large number of sensors and control units. However, the systems become more vulnerable as detection and…
Choosing a hard-to-guess secret is a prerequisite in many security applications. Whether it is a password for user authentication or a secret key for a cryptographic primitive, picking it requires the user to trade-off usability costs with…
This paper presents a game-theoretic framework to study the interactions of attack and defense for deep learning-based NextG signal classification. NextG systems such as the one envisioned for a massive number of IoT devices can employ deep…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
When investing in cyber security resources, information security managers have to follow effective decision-making strategies. We refer to this as the cyber security investment challenge. In this paper, we consider three possible…
We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing…
In this paper we use game theory to model poisoning attack scenarios. We prove the non-existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the attacker and defender game. We then propose a mixed extension of our game model and an algorithm to…
In this paper, we investigate game-theoretic strategies for containing spreading processes on large-scale networks. Specifically, we consider the class of networked susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemics where a large population…
We study public goods games played on networks with possibly non-reciprocal relationships between players. Examples for this type of interactions include one-sided relationships, mutual but unequal relationships, and parasitism. It is well…
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have created new security challenges for critical infrastructures due to their stealthy, dynamic, and adaptive natures. In this work, we aim to lay a game-theoretic foundation by establishing a multi-stage…
We establish a Nash equilibrium in a market with $ N $ agents with the performance criteria of relative wealth level when the market return is unobservable. Each investor has a random prior belief on the return rate of the risky asset. The…