Related papers: On the confidentiality of controller states under …

Controller confidentiality under sensor attacks refers to whether the internal states of the controller can be estimated when the adversary knows the model of the plant and controller, while only having access to sensors, but not the…

In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy false data injection attacks on sensors. We start by defining the stealthiness notion in the most general form where an attack is…

Attacks, including the manipulation of sensor readings and the modification of actuator commands, pose a significant challenge to the security and privacy of automated systems. This paper considers discrete event systems that can be modeled…

The vast majority of today's critical infrastructure is supported by numerous feedback control loops and an attack on these control loops can have disastrous consequences. This is a major concern since modern control systems are becoming…

We consider the problem of controller design for linear time-invariant cyber-physical systems (CPSs) controlled via networks. Specifically, we adopt the set-up that a controller has already been designed to stabilize the plant. However, the…

We consider malicious attacks on actuators and sensors of a feedback system which can be modeled as additive, possibly unbounded, disturbances at the digital (cyber) part of the feedback loop. We precisely characterize the role of the…

Maintaining the security of control systems in the presence of integrity attacks is a significant challenge. In literature, several possible attacks against control systems have been formulated including replay, false data injection, and…

Cyber-physical systems can be subject to sensor attacks, e.g., sensor spoofing, leading to unsafe behaviors. This paper addresses this problem in the context of linear systems when an omniscient attacker can spoof several system sensors at…

In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy sensor attacks. We start by defining the notion of stealthy attacks in the most general form by leveraging Neyman-Pearson lemma;…

The increase in network connectivity has also resulted in several high-profile attacks on cyber-physical systems. An attacker that manages to access a local network could remotely affect control performance by tampering with sensor…

In this work, we evaluate theoretical results on the feasibility of, the worst-case impact of, and defense mechanisms against a stealthy sensor attack in an experimental setup. We demonstrate that for a controller with stable dynamics the…

We propose a new defense mechanism against undetected infiltration into controllers in cyber-physical systems. To this end, we cautiously design the outputs of the sensors that monitor the state of the system. Different from the defense…

We study the performance of perception-based control systems in the presence of attacks, and provide methods for modeling and analysis of their resiliency to stealthy attacks on both physical and perception-based sensing. Specifically, we…

We study the problem of remote state estimation, in the presence of an eavesdropper. An authorized user estimates the state of a linear plant, based on the data received from a sensor, while the data may also be intercepted by the…

The state estimation of continuous-time nonlinear systems in which a subset of sensor outputs can be maliciously controlled through injecting a potentially unbounded additive signal is considered in this paper. Analogous to our earlier work…

This paper considers a cyber-physical system under an active eavesdropping attack. A remote legitimate user estimates the state of a linear plant from the state information received from a sensor. Transmissions from the sensor occur via an…

Closed-loop control systems employ continuous sensing and actuation to maintain controlled variables within preset bounds and achieve the desired system output. Intentional disturbances in the system, such as in the case of cyberattacks,…

Network-based attacks on control systems may alter sensor data delivered to the controller, effectively causing degradation in control performance. As a result, having access to accurate state estimates, even in the presence of attacks on…

We address the problem of estimating the state of a differentially flat system from measurements that may be corrupted by an adversarial attack. In cyber-physical systems, malicious attacks can directly compromise the system's sensors or…

In this paper, we introduce a new vulnerability of cyber-physical systems to malicious attack. It arises when the physical plant, that is modeled as a continuous-time LTI system, is controlled by a digital controller. In the sampled-data…