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Globalization processes interweave economic structures at a worldwide scale, trade playing a central role as one of the elemental channels of interaction among countries. Despite the significance of such phenomena, measuring economic…
We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…
Bilateral bargaining under incomplete information provides a controlled testbed for evaluating large language model (LLM) agent capabilities. Bilateral trade demands individual rationality, strategic surplus maximization, and cooperation to…
While it is known that shared quantum entanglement can offer improved solutions to a number of purely cooperative tasks for groups of remote agents, controversy remains regarding the legitimacy of quantum games in a competitive setting--in…
We studied the behavior and variation of utility between the two conflicting players in a closed Nash-equilibrium loop. Our modeling approach also captured the nexus between optimal premium strategizing and firm performance using the…
This study explores the design of an efficient rebate policy in auction markets, focusing on a continuous-time setting with competition among market participants. In this model, a stock exchange collects transaction fees from auction…
Personalized pricing is a business strategy to charge different prices to individual consumers based on their characteristics and behaviors. It has become common practice in many industries nowadays due to the availability of a growing…
We study the role and drivers of persistence in the extensive margin of bilateral trade. Motivated by a stylized heterogeneous firms model of international trade with market entry costs, we consider dynamic three-way fixed effects binary…
We consider the problem of optimal exchange which can be formulated as a kind of optimal transportation problem. The existence of an optimal solution and a duality theorem for the optimal exchange problem are proved in case of completely…
This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group…
Bipartite matching, where agents on one side of a market are matched to agents or items on the other, is a classical problem in computer science and economics, with widespread application in healthcare, education, advertising, and general…
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An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…