Related papers: Efficient allocations in double auction markets
In this work we consider selling items using a sequential first price auction mechanism. We generalize the assumption of conservative bidding to extensive form games (henceforth optimistic conservative bidding), and show that for both…
We develop a method using parameterized linear equations to define trading mechanisms in market design models. Our method adeptly addresses challenges arising from factors such as complex endowments or coarse priorities, while offering…
We investigate the tradeoffs between fairness and efficiency when allocating indivisible items over time. Suppose T items arrive over time and must be allocated upon arrival, immediately and irrevocably, to one of n agents. Agent i assigns…
The Hylland-Zeckhauser gave a classic pricing-based mechanism (HZ) for a one-sided matching market; it yields allocations satisfying Pareto optimality and envy-freeness (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979), and the mechanism is incentive…
In a combinatorial exchange setting, players place sell (resp. buy) bids on combinations of traded goods. Besides the question of finding an optimal selection of winning bids, the question of how to share the obtained profit is of high…
Matching markets are of particular interest in computer science and economics literature as they are often used to model real-world phenomena where we aim to equitably distribute a limited amount of resources to multiple agents and…
Inspired by Internet ad auction applications, we study the problem of allocating a single item via an auction when bidders place very different values on the item. We formulate this as the problem of prior-free auction and focus on…
This paper considers the ideal gas-like model of trading markets, where each individual is identified as a gas molecule that interacts with others trading in elastic or money-conservative collisions. Traditionally this model introduces…
We develop a robust framework for pricing and hedging of derivative securities in discrete-time financial markets. We consider markets with both dynamically and statically traded assets and make minimal measurability assumptions. We obtain…
Periodic Double Auctions (PDAs) are commonly used in the real world for trading, e.g. in stock markets to determine stock opening prices, and energy markets to trade energy in order to balance net demand in smart grids, involving trillions…
Sequential allocation is a simple mechanism for sharing multiple indivisible items. We study strategic behavior in sequential allocation. In particular, we consider Nash dynamics, as well as the computation and Pareto optimality of pure…
Sequential auctions for identical items with unit-demand, private-value buyers are common and often occur periodically without end, as new bidders replace departing ones. We model bidder uncertainty by introducing a probability that a…
Constraints on agent's ability to pay play a major role in auction design for any setting where the magnitude of financial transactions is sufficiently large. Those constraints have been traditionally modeled in mechanism design as…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible objects to a set of rational agents where each agent's final utility depends on the intrinsic valuation of the allocated item as well as the allocation within the agent's local neighbourhood.…
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…
In this study, we propose the polyhedral clinching auction for indivisible goods, which has so far been studied for divisible goods. As in the divisible setting by Goel et al. (2015), our mechanism enjoys incentive compatibility, individual…
We study the optimal decisions and equilibria of agents who aim to minimize their risks by allocating their positions over extremely heavy-tailed (i.e., infinite-mean) and possibly dependent losses. The loss distributions of our focus are…
The theory of algorithmic fair allocation is within the center of multi-agent systems and economics in the last decade due to its industrial and social importance. At a high level, the problem is to assign a set of items that are either…
With spectrum auctions as our prime motivation, in this paper we analyze combinatorial auctions where agents' valuations exhibit complementarities. Assuming that the agents only value bundles of size at most $k$ and also assuming that we…
A truthful mechanism for a Bayesian single-item auction results with some ex-ante revenue for the seller, and some ex-ante total surplus for the buyers. We study the Pareto frontier of the set of seller-buyers ex-ante utilities, generated…