Related papers: Efficiency Axioms for simplicial complexes
We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and…
We consider an optimal partition of resources (e.g. consumers) between several agents (e.g. experts), given utility functions ("wisdoms") for the agents and their capacities. This problem is a variant of optimal transport…
Shared-constraint games are noncooperative $N$-player games where players are coupled through a common coupling constraint. It is known that such games admit two kinds of equilibria -- generalized Nash equilibria (GNE) and variational…
Cooperative games are an important class of problems in game theory, where the goal is to distribute a value among a set of players who are allowed to cooperate by forming coalitions. An outcome of the game is given by an allocation vector…
This paper extends the theory of subset team games, a generalization of cooperative game theory requiring a payoff function that is defined for all subsets of players. This subset utility is used to define both altruistic and selfish…
The model of incomplete cooperative games incorporates uncertainty into the classical model of cooperative games by considering a partial characteristic function. Thus the values for some of the coalitions are not known. The main focus of…
A new approach for the description of phenomena of social aggregation is suggested. On the basis of psychological concepts (as for instance social norms and cultural coordinates), we deduce a general mechanism for the social aggregation in…
Measuring individual productivity (or equivalently distributing the overall productivity) in a network structure of workers displaying peer effects has been a subject of ongoing interest in many areas ranging from academia to industry. In…
The optimization of facility-based systems is considered. First, the congestion game is converted into a matrix form, so that the matrix approach is applicable. Then, a facility-based system with a system performance criterion is…
Cooperative games can be distinguished as non-cooperative games in which players can freely sign binding agreements to form coalitions. These coalitions inherit a joint strategy set and seek to maximize collective payoffs. When the payoffs…
We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in which the goal is to partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions so as to maximize the social welfare. One of our key results is a general polynomial-time algorithm…
We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source $s$ and sink $t$ is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an $s$-$t$ path,…
this paper addresses the issue of the relation between the system efficiency and the individual performance with different combinations of agent memory lengths in mix-game model which is an extension of minority game (MG). In mix-game,…
A simple model for cooperation between "selfish" agents, which play an extended version of the Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) game, in which they use arbitrary payoffs, is presented and studied. A continuous variable, representing the probability…
The latest developments in AI focus on agentic systems where artificial and human agents cooperate to realize global goals. An example is collaborative learning, which aims to train a global model based on data from individual agents. A…
We deal with coalitional games possessing strictly positive values. Individually rational allocations of such a game has clear fractional interpretations. Many concepts, including the long-existing core and other stability notions more…
In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We concentrate on…
We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to…
Motivated by the fact that the worth of a coalition may depend on the order in which agents arrive, Nowak and Radzik (1994) (NR) introduced cooperative games with generalized characteristic functions. We study such temporal cooperative…
This paper studies the formation of the grand coalition of a cooperative game by investigating its possible internal dynamics. Each coalition is capable of forcing all players to reconsider the current state of the game when it does not…