Related papers: Coalition-Safe Equilibria with Virtual Payoffs
We initiate the study of transaction fee mechanism design for blockchain protocols in which multiple block producers contribute to the production of each block. Our contributions include: - We propose an extensive-form (multi-stage) game…
This paper presents a reformulation in topos logic of a safety result arising in an abstract presentation of blockchain consensus protocols. That is, in a high-level template for "correct-by-construction" consensus protocols, it is shown…
In this paper, we investigate the impact of reward schemes and committee sizes motivated by governance systems over blockchain communities. We introduce a model for elections with a binary outcome space where there is a ground truth (i.e.,…
Mining processes of Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies are currently incentivized with voluntary transaction fees and fixed block rewards which will halve gradually to zero. In the setting where optional and arbitrary transaction fee…
The Egalitarian Allocation (EA) is a well-known profit sharing method for cooperative games which attempts to distribute profit among participants in a most equal way while respecting the individual contributions to the obtained profit.…
Blockchain applications that rely on the Proof-of-Work (PoW) have increasingly become energy inefficient with a staggering carbon footprint. In contrast, energy-efficient alternative consensus protocols such as Proof-of-Stake (PoS) may…
We analyze Bitcoin mining from the perspective of a game and propose an optimal mining model that maximizes profits of pools and miners. The model is a two-stage Stackelberg game in which each stage forms a sub-game. In stage I, pools are…
Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game…
Formal analyses of incentives for compliance with network protocols often appeal to game-theoretic models and concepts. Applications of game-theoretic analysis to network security have generally been limited to highly stylized models, where…
This paper presents a comprehensive refutation of the so-called "blockchain trilemma," a widely cited but formally ungrounded claim asserting an inherent trade-off between decentralisation, security, and scalability in blockchain protocols.…
The security of most existing cryptocurrencies is based on a concept called Proof-of-Work, in which users must solve a computationally hard cryptopuzzle to authorize transactions (`one unit of computation, one vote'). This leads to enormous…
As an emerging decentralized secure data management platform, blockchain has gained much popularity recently. To maintain a canonical state of blockchain data record, proof-of-work based consensus protocols provide the nodes, referred to as…
The introduction of new services, such as Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), requires a massive investment that cannot be assumed by a single stakeholder, for instance the Infrastructure Provider (InP). Service Providers (SPs) however also have…
Blockchain is rapidly emerging as an important class of network application, with a unique set of trust, security and transparency properties. In a blockchain system, participants record and update the `server-side' state of an application…
This paper addresses the benefit allocation in a mixed-energy truck platoon composed of fuel-powered and electric trucks. The interactions among trucks during platoon formation are modeled as a coalitional game with transferable utility. We…
Proof of Stake (PoS) is a burgeoning Sybil resistance mechanism that aims to have a digital asset ("token") serve as security collateral in crypto networks. However, PoS has so far eluded a comprehensive threat model that encompasses both…
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchain systems, especially those that allow stakeholders to organize themselves in ``stake-pools'', have emerged as a compelling paradigm for the deployment of large scale distributed ledgers. A stake-pool operates…
We develop a general and practical framework to address the problem of the optimal design of dynamic fee mechanisms for multiple blockchain resources. Our framework allows to compute policies that optimally trade-off between adjusting…
Leader-based protocols for consensus, i.e., atomic broadcast, allow some processes to unilaterally affect the final order of transactions. This has become a problem for blockchain networks and decentralized finance because it facilitates…
To address the large amount of energy wasted by blockchains, we propose a decentralized consensus protocol for blockchains in which the computation can be used to search for good approximate solutions to any optimization problem. Our…