Related papers: Generalized Rental Harmony
The classic Stable Roommates problem (which is the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage problem) asks whether there is a stable matching for a given set of agents, i.e. a partitioning of the agents into disjoint…
We study the envy-free house allocation problem when agents have uncertain preferences over items and consider several well-studied preference uncertainty models. The central problem that we focus on is computing an allocation that has the…
The classical Stable Roommates problem is to decide whether there exists a matching of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to each other would prefer to be with each other rather than with their…
AI-powered scarce resource allocation policies rely on predictions to target either specific individuals (e.g., high-risk) or settings (e.g., neighborhoods). Recent research on individual-level targeting demonstrates conflicting results;…
Motivated by the need to understand the factors driving gentrification, we introduce and analyze two simple dynamical systems that model the interplay between three potential drivers of the phenomenon. The constructed systems are based on…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
We consider the popular matching problem in a roommates instance with strict preference lists. While popular matchings always exist in a bipartite instance, they need not exist in a roommates instance. The complexity of the popular matching…
The classic house allocation problem involves assigning $m$ houses to $n$ agents based on their utility functions, ensuring each agent receives exactly one house. A key criterion in these problems is satisfying fairness constraints such as…
We study a fair resource sharing problem, where a set of resources are to be shared among a group of agents. Each agent demands one resource and each resource can serve a limited number of agents. An agent cares about what resource they get…
We formalize an allocation model under ordinal preferences that is more general than the well-studied Shapley-Scarf housing market. In our model, the agents do not just care which house or resource they get but also care about who gets…
The classical house allocation problem involves assigning $n$ houses (or items) to $n$ agents according to their preferences. A key criterion in such problems is satisfying some fairness constraints such as envy-freeness. We consider a…
In many economic contexts, agents from a same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called "roommate matching problems"), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We…
Homelessness in American cities is becoming an ever more prominent issue, but its causes remain contested, ranging from mental health and substance abuse to housing affordability and local labor markets. To shed light on this issue, I…
As affordability pressures and tight rental markets in global cities mount, online shared accommodation sites proliferate. Home sharing arrangements present dilemmas for planning that aims to improve health and safety standards, while…
We consider the problem of computing popular matchings in a bipartite graph G = (R U H, E) where R and H denote a set of residents and a set of hospitals respectively. Each hospital h has a positive capacity denoting the number of residents…
Rental assistance programs provide individuals with financial assistance to prevent housing instabilities caused by evictions and avert homelessness. Since these programs operate under resource constraints, they must decide who to…
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman, who are not married to each other, both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from…
Schelling's segregation model is a landmark model in sociology. It shows the counter-intuitive phenomenon that residential segregation between individuals of different groups can emerge even when all involved individuals are tolerant.…
A recently introduced restricted variant of the multidimensional stable roommate problem is the roommate diversity problem: each agent belongs to one of two types (e.g., red and blue), and the agents' preferences over the coalitions solely…
We study popular matchings in three classical settings: the house allocation problem, the marriage problem, and the roommates problem. In the popular matching problem, (a subset of) the vertices in a graph have preference orderings over…