Related papers: Analysis of Moving Target Defense Against False Da…
Present attack methods can make state-of-the-art classification systems based on deep neural networks misclassify every adversarially modified test example. The design of general defense strategies against a wide range of such attacks still…
Reactive defense mechanisms, such as intrusion detection systems, have made significant efforts to secure a system or network for the last several decades. However, the nature of reactive security mechanisms has limitations because…
Deep learning based visual sensing has achieved attractive accuracy but is shown vulnerable to adversarial example attacks. Specifically, once the attackers obtain the deep model, they can construct adversarial examples to mislead the model…
In this work, we model Moving Target Defence (MTD) as a partially observable stochastic game between an attacker and a defender. The attacker tries to compromise the system through probing actions, while the defender minimizes the risk by…
Intelligently designed false data injection (FDI) attacks have been shown to be able to bypass the $\chi^2$-test based bad data detector (BDD), resulting in physical consequences (such as line overloads) in the power system. In this paper,…
As one of the most sophisticated attacks against power grids, coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs) damage the power grid's physical infrastructure and use a simultaneous cyber attack to mask its effect. This work proposes a novel…
The false data injection (FDI) attack is a crucial form of cyber-physical security problems facing cyber-physical power systems. However, there is no research revealing the problem of FDI attacks facing voltage source converter based high…
Graph signal processing (GSP) has emerged as a powerful tool for practical network applications, including power system monitoring. Recent research has focused on developing GSP-based methods for state estimation, attack detection, and…
This letter proposes a novel, fully distributed, transient-safe resilient secondary control strategies for AC microgrids, addressing unbounded false data injection (FDI) attacks on control input channels. Unlike existing methods that focus…
This paper studies the deployment of joint moving target defense (MTD) and deception against multi-stage cyberattacks. Given the system equipped with MTD that randomizes between different configurations, we investigate how to allocate a…
Moving Target Defense (MTD) has emerged as a proactive and dynamic framework to counteract evolving cyber threats. Traditional MTD approaches often rely on assumptions about the attackers knowledge and behavior. However, real-world…
False Data Injection (FDI) attacks are a significant threat to modern power systems. Although numerous research studies have focused on FDI attacks on power systems, these studies have primarily concentrated on designing or detecting DC FDI…
In the recent years cyberattacks to smart grids are becoming more frequent Among the many malicious activities that can be launched against smart grids False Data Injection FDI attacks have raised significant concerns from both academia and…
The evolution of the traditional power system towards the modern smart grid has posed many new cybersecurity challenges to this critical infrastructure. One of the most dangerous cybersecurity threats is the False Data Injection (FDI)…
Robust control and maintenance of the grid relies on accurate data. Both PMUs and state estimators are prone to false data injection attacks. Thus, it is crucial to have a mechanism for fast and accurate detection of an agent maliciously…
The false data injection (FDI) attack cannot be detected by the traditional anomaly detection techniques used in the energy system state estimators. In this paper, we demonstrate how FDI attacks can be constructed blindly, i.e., without…
Modern advances in sensor, computing, and communication technologies enable various smart grid applications. The heavy dependence on communication technology has highlighted the vulnerability of the electricity grid to false data injection…
With the boom of edge intelligence, its vulnerability to adversarial attacks becomes an urgent problem. The so-called adversarial example can fool a deep learning model on the edge node to misclassify. Due to the property of…
Most traditional false data injection attack (FDIA) detection approaches rely on a key assumption, i.e., the power system can be accurately modeled. However, the transmission line parameters are dynamic and cannot be accurately known during…
Power systems are moving towards hybrid AC/DC grids with the integration of HVDC links, renewable resources and energy storage modules. New models of frequency control have to consider the complex interactions between these components.…