Related papers: Influence in Weighted Committees
We exhibit the hidden beauty of weighted voting and voting power by applying a generalization of the Penrose-Banzhaf index to social choice rules. Three players who have multiple votes in a committee decide between three options by…
Many binary collective choice situations can be described as weighted simple voting games. We introduce weighted committee games to model decisions on an arbitrary number of alternatives in analogous fashion. We compare the effect of…
In a weighted majority voting game, the players' weights are determined based on the constitutional planner's intentions. The weights are challenging to change in numerous cases, as they represent some desired disparity. However, the voting…
The International Monetary Fund is one of the largest international organizations using a weighted voting system. The weights of its 188 members are determined by a fixed amount of basic votes plus some extra votes for so-called Special…
Weighted voting games are frequently used in decision making. Each voter has a weight and a proposal is accepted if the weight sum of the supporting voters exceeds a quota. One line of research is the efficient computation of so-called…
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political science, neuroscience, threshold logic, reliability theory and distributed systems. They model situations where agents with variable voting…
We investigate a class of weighted voting games for which weights are randomly distributed over the standard probability simplex. We provide close-formed formulae for the expectation and density of the distribution of weight of the $k$-th…
Voting power determines the "power" of individuals who cast votes; their power is based on their ability to influence the winning-ness of a coalition. Usually each individual acts alone, casting either all or none of their votes and is…
Decisions in a shareholder meeting or a legislative committee are often modeled as a weighted game. Influence of a member is then measured by a power index. A large variety of different indices has been introduced in the literature. This…
We introduce new power indices to measure the a priori voting power of voters in liquid democracy elections where an underlying network restricts delegations. We argue that our power indices are natural extensions of the standard…
There has been much recent work on multiwinner voting systems. However, sometimes a committee is highly structured, and if we want to vote for such a committee, our voting method should be more structured as well. We consider committees…
Several power indices have been introduced in the literature in order to measure the influence of individual committee members on the aggregated decision. Here we ask the inverse question and aim to design voting rules for a committee such…
We consider a committee voting on whether to adopt a reform under a quota rule, where members differ in how much they value the reform some supporting it, others opposing it. We examine how members can influence each other's votes through…
We examine two aspects of the mathematical basis for two-tier voting systems, such as that of the Council of the European Union. These aspects concern the use of square-root weights and the choice of quota. Square-root weights originate in…
This paper provides a serious attempt towards constructing a switching-algebraic theory for weighted monotone voting systems, whether they are scalar-weighted or vector-weighted. The paper concentrates on the computation of a prominent…
Determining the power distribution of the members of a shareholder meeting or a legislative committee is a well-known problem for many applications. In some cases it turns out that power is nearly proportional to relative voting weights,…
We study the Shapley value in weighted voting games. The Shapley value has been used as an index for measuring the power of individual agents in decision-making bodies and political organizations, where decisions are made by a majority vote…
Binary yes-no decisions in a legislative committee or a shareholder meeting are commonly modeled as a weighted game. However, there are noteworthy exceptions. E.g., the voting rules of the European Council according to the Treaty of Lisbon…
In this paper, we propose an improved version of the power index related to the Banzhaf power index for weighted voting systems. This index now takes into account the mutual persuasion power matrix(PPM) existing among the voters. This…
Given a system where the real-valued states of the agents are aggregated by a function to a real-valued state of the entire system, we are interested in the influence or importance of the different agents for that function. This generalizes…