Related papers: Competitive Contagion with Sparse Seeding
We study the problem of pricing under a Multinomial Logit model where we incorporate network effects over the consumer's decisions. We analyse both cases, when sellers compete or collaborate. In particular, we pay special attention to the…
This paper examines strategic trading under incomplete information, where firms lack full knowledge of key aspects of their competitors' trading strategies such as target sizes and market impact models. We extend previous work on…
We consider the problem of devising incentive strategies for viral marketing of a product. In particular, we assume that the seller can influence penetration of the product by offering two incentive programs: a) direct incentives to…
It is widely believed that one's peers influence product adoption behaviors. This relationship has been linked to the number of signals a decision-maker receives in a social network. But it is unclear if these same principles hold when the…
This paper describes a mechanism for content distribution through opportunistic contacts between subscribers. A subset of subscribers in the network are seeded with the content. The remaining subscribers obtain the information through…
With the growing collection of sales and marketing data and depth of detailed knowledge of consumer habits and trends, firms are gaining the capability to discern customers of other firms from the potential market of uncommitted consumers.…
We investigate an SIR model of epidemic propagation on networks in the context of mean-field games. In a real epidemic, individuals adjust their behavior depending on the epidemic level and the impact it might have on them in the future.…
This paper studies the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem for aggregative games with coupling constraints, where each player optimizes its strategy depending on its local cost function and the estimated strategy…
We consider a distributed IoT network, where each node wants to minimize its age of information and there is a cost to make any transmission. A collision model is considered, where any transmission is successful from a node to a common…
Recommendation systems are pervasive in the digital economy. An important assumption in many deployed systems is that user consumption reflects user preferences in a static sense: users consume the content they like with no other…
This paper develops strategic foundations for an important statistical model of random networks with heterogeneous expected degrees. Based on this, we show how social networking services that subtly alter the costs and indirect benefits of…
This paper studies a stochastic dynamic game between two competing teams, each consisting of a network of collaborating agents. Unlike fully cooperative settings, where all agents share a common objective, each team in this game aims to…
In this paper, we study the problem of consensus-based distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking where a network of players, abstracted as a directed graph, aim to minimize their own local cost functions non-cooperatively. Considering the…
This paper explores distributed aggregative games in multi-agent systems. Current methods for finding distributed Nash equilibrium require players to send original messages to their neighbors, leading to communication burden and privacy…
We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…
Game-theoretic analyses of distributed and peer-to-peer systems typically use the Nash equilibrium solution concept, but this explicitly excludes the possibility of strategic behavior involving more than one agent. We examine the effects of…
Motivated by scenarios of epidemic competition, as well as how social contagions spread at the level of individuals, this work considers the competition between two conflicting node states that spread over a social graph according to a…
We consider a game-theoretic setting in which selfish individuals compete over resources of varying quality. The motivating example is a group of animals that disperse over patches of food of different abundances. In such scenarios,…
The rate of adoption of new information depends on reinforcement from multiple sources in a way that often cannot be described by simple contagion processes. In such cases, contagion is said to be complex. Complex contagion happens in the…
In this paper, we develop a mean-field game model for SEIR epidemics on heterogeneous contact networks, where individuals choose state-dependent contact effort to balance infection losses against the social and economic costs of isolation.…