Related papers: Estimation of Auction Models with Shape Restrictio…

We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of budget constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of resources, which come at a cost, so as not to exceed a given budget and at the same…

We propose to address the common problem of linear estimation in linear statistical models by using a model selection approach via penalization. Depending then on the framework in which the linear statistical model is considered namely the…

This paper describes a new win-rate based bid shading algorithm (WR) that does not rely on the minimum-bid-to-win feedback from a Sell-Side Platform (SSP). The method uses a modified logistic regression to predict the profit from each…

In the standard single-dimensional model of position auctions, bidders agree on the relative values of the positions and each of them submits a single bid that is interpreted in terms of these values. Motivated by current practice in…

Motivated by the need to analyze continuously updated data sets in the context of time-to-event modeling, we propose a novel nonparametric approach to estimate the conditional hazard function given a set of continuous and discrete…

First-price auctions are one of the most popular mechanisms for selling goods and services, with applications ranging from display advertising to timber sales. Unlike their close cousin, the second-price auction, first-price auctions do not…

The estimation of parameters in a linear model is considered under the hypothesis that the noise, with finite second order statistics, can be represented in a given deterministic basis by random coefficients. An extended underdetermined…

Today, many auctions are carried out with the help of intermediary platforms like Google and eBay. We refer to such auctions as platform-assisted auctions.Traditionally, the auction theory literature mainly focuses on designing auctions…

This paper proposes a diffusion-based auto-bidding framework that leverages graph representations to model large-scale auction environments. In such settings, agents must dynamically optimize bidding strategies under constraints defined by…

We consider model selection and estimation for partial spline models and propose a new regularization method in the context of smoothing splines. The regularization method has a simple yet elegant form, consisting of roughness penalty on…

Generalized linear models and the quasi-likelihood method extend the ordinary regression models to accommodate more general conditional distributions of the response. Nonparametric methods need no explicit parametric specification, and the…

Contemporary real-world online ad auctions differ from canonical models [Edelman et al., 2007; Varian, 2009] in at least four ways: (1) values and click-through rates can depend upon users' search queries, but advertisers can only partially…

Auction theory traditionally assumes that bidders' valuation distributions are known to the auctioneer, such as in the celebrated, revenue-optimal Myerson auction. However, this theory does not describe how the auctioneer comes to possess…

In this paper, we propose a new semiparametric regression estimator by using a hybrid technique of a parametric approach and a nonparametric penalized spline method. The overall shape of the true regression function is captured by the…

In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical outcome of the auction that is the only…

We propose a novel approach for estimating conditional or parametric expectations in the setting where obtaining samples or evaluating integrands is costly. Through the framework of probabilistic numerical methods (such as Bayesian…

We consider a dynamic pricing problem for repeated contextual second-price auctions with multiple strategic buyers who aim to maximize their long-term time discounted utility. The seller has limited information on buyers' overall demand…

We present a quantum auction protocol using superpositions to represent bids and distributed search to identify the winner(s). Measuring the final quantum state gives the auction outcome while simultaneously destroying the superposition.…

A line of recent work provides welfare guarantees of simple combinatorial auction formats, such as selling m items via simultaneous second price auctions (SiSPAs) (Christodoulou et al. 2008, Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011, Feldman et al.…

We propose a new estimator for the high-dimensional linear regression model with observation error in the design where the number of coefficients is potentially larger than the sample size. The main novelty of our procedure is that the…