Related papers: Robust Market Equilibria with Uncertain Preference…
Most finance studies are discussed on the basis of several hypotheses, for example, investors rationally optimize their investment strategies. However, the hypotheses themselves are sometimes criticized. Market impacts, where trades of…
We consider repeated allocation of a shared resource via a non-monetary mechanism, wherein a single item must be allocated to one of multiple agents in each round. We assume that each agent has i.i.d. values for the item across rounds, and…
We revisit the classical topic of quadratic and linear mean-variance equilibria with both financial and real assets. The novelty of our results is that they are the first allowing for equilibrium prices driven by general semimartingales and…
The theory of algorithmic fair allocation is within the center of multi-agent systems and economics in the last decade due to its industrial and social importance. At a high level, the problem is to assign a set of items that are either…
We consider markets consisting of a set of indivisible items, and buyers that have {\em sharp} multi-unit demand. This means that each buyer $i$ wants a specific number $d_i$ of items; a bundle of size less than $d_i$ has no value, while a…
Dworczak et al. (2021) study when certain market structures are optimal in the presence of heterogeneous preferences. A key assumption is that the social planner knows the joint distribution of the value of the good and marginal value of…
We consider the problem of belief aggregation: given a group of individual agents with probabilistic beliefs over a set of uncertain events, formulate a sensible consensus or aggregate probability distribution over these events. Researchers…
We study the classic setting of envy-free pricing, in which a single seller chooses prices for its many items, with the goal of maximizing revenue once the items are allocated. Despite the large body of work addressing such settings, most…
We consider a discrete-time model of a financial market where a risky asset is bought and sold with transactions having a transient price impact. It is shown that the corresponding utility maximization problem admits a solution. We manage…
This paper is concerned with personalized pricing models aimed at maximizing the expected revenues or profits for a single item. While it is essential for personalized pricing to predict the purchase probabilities for each consumer, these…
Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting and…
In this paper we consider multidimensional mechanism design problem for selling discrete substitutable items to a group of buyers. Previous work on this problem mostly focus on stochastic description of valuations used by the seller.…
Recommendation systems when employed in markets play a dual role: they assist users in selecting their most desired items from a large pool and they help in allocating a limited number of items to the users who desire them the most. Despite…
We consider two market designs for a network of prosumers, trading energy: (i) a centralized design which acts as a benchmark, and (ii) a peer-to-peer market design. High renewable energy penetration requires that the energy market design…
Motivated by the convergence result of mirror-descent algorithms to market equilibria in linear Fisher markets, it is natural for one to consider designing dynamics (specifically, iterative algorithms) for agents to arrive at linear…
Stability of the utility maximization problem with random endowment and indifference prices is studied for a sequence of financial markets in an incomplete Brownian setting. Our novelty lies in the nonequivalence of markets, in which the…
Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice…
This paper proposes the notion of robust PBE in a general competing mechanism game of incomplete information where a mechanism allows its designer to send a message to himself at the same time agents send messages. It identifies the utility…
Fair resource allocation is an important problem in many real-world scenarios, where resources such as goods and chores must be allocated among agents. In this survey, we delve into the intricacies of fair allocation, focusing specifically…
In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…