Related papers: ColosseumRL: A Framework for Multiagent Reinforcem…

We consider multi-agent decision making, where each agent optimizes its cost function subject to constraints. Agents' actions belong to a compact convex Euclidean space and the agents' cost functions are coupled. We propose a distributed…

Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…

In zero-sum games, the optimal strategy is well-defined by the Nash equilibrium. However, it is overly conservative when playing against suboptimal opponents and it can not exploit their weaknesses. Limited look-ahead game solving in…

In reinforcement learning (RL), the term self-play describes a kind of multi-agent learning (MAL) that deploys an algorithm against copies of itself to test compatibility in various stochastic environments. As is typical in MAL, the…

We introduce the LLM-Nash framework, a game-theoretic model where agents select reasoning prompts to guide decision-making via Large Language Models (LLMs). Unlike classical games that assume utility-maximizing agents with full rationality,…

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) -- where multiple agents learn to interact in a shared dynamic environment -- permeates across a wide range of critical applications. While there has been substantial progress on understanding the…

This paper presents an algorithmic framework for learning robust policies in asymmetric imperfect-information games, where the joint reward could depend on the uncertain opponent type (a private information known only to the opponent itself…

This paper studies mean field games for multi-agent systems with control-dependent multiplicative noises. For the general systems with nonuniform agents, we obtain a set of decentralized strategies by solving an auxiliary limiting optimal…

We study $n$-agent Bayesian Games with $m$-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called Linear Multidimensional Bayesian Games. This class of games is equivalent with $n$-agent, $m$-game Uniform Multigames. We distinguish…

In this paper we present a scalable deep learning framework for finding Markovian Nash Equilibria in multi-agent stochastic games using fictitious play. The motivation is inspired by theoretical analysis of Forward Backward Stochastic…

Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…

Finding Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum continuous games is a central problem in machine learning, e.g. for training both GANs and robust models. The existence of pure Nash equilibria requires strong conditions which are not…

We initiate the study of how to perturb the reward in a zero-sum Markov game with two players to induce a desirable Nash equilibrium, namely arbitrating. Such a problem admits a bi-level optimization formulation. The lower level requires…

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic…

Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as corresponding to players in a game; plays represent the…

Game balancing is a longstanding challenge requiring repeated playtesting, expert intuition, and extensive manual tuning. We introduce RuleSmith, the first framework that achieves automated game balancing by leveraging the reasoning…

Traditional reinforcement learning and planning typically requires vast amounts of data and training to develop effective policies. In contrast, large language models (LLMs) exhibit strong generalization and zero-shot capabilities, but…

Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…

We study the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) in Markov games which is a cornerstone in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). In particular, we focus on infinite-horizon adversarial team Markov games (ATMGs) in which agents…

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in competitive multi-agent settings, raising fundamental questions about whether they converge to equilibria and how their strategic behavior can be characterized. In this paper,…