Related papers: Camouflage: Hardware-assisted CFI for the ARM Linu…

The Linux kernel extensively uses the Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) to allow user-written BPF applications to execute in the kernel space. The BPF employs a verifier to check the security of user-supplied BPF code statically. Recent attacks…

Lightweight authentication is essential for resource-constrained Internet-of-Things (IoT). Implementable with low resource and operable with low power, Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have the potential as hardware primitives for…

Extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) is a runtime that enables users to load programs into the operating system (OS) kernel, like Linux or Windows, and execute them safely and efficiently at designated kernel hooks. Each program passes…

In this work we present the Secure Machine, SeM for short, a CPU architecture extension for secure computing. SeM uses a small amount of in-chip additional hardware that monitors key communication channels inside the CPU chip, and only acts…

Embedded systems are parts of our daily life and used in many fields. They can be found in smartphones or in modern cars including GPS, light/rain sensors and other electronic assistance mechanisms. These systems may handle sensitive data…

Foreign Function Interfaces (FFIs) are essential for enabling interoperability between programming languages, yet existing FFI solutions are ill-suited for the dynamic, interactive workflows prevalent in modern notebook environments such as…

We present the design, implementation, and evaluation of FineIBT: a CFI enforcement mechanism that improves the precision of hardware-assisted CFI solutions, like Intel IBT, by instrumenting program code to reduce the valid/allowed targets…

Securing low-latency I/O in commodity systems forces a fundamental trade-off: rely on the kernel's high overhead mediated interface, or bypass it entirely, exposing sensitive hardware resources to userspace and creating new vulnerabilities.…

Penetration testing, a critical component of cybersecurity, typically requires extensive time and effort to find vulnerabilities. Beginners in this field often benefit from collaborative approaches with the community or experts. To address…

Large language models (LLMs) deployed behind APIs and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) stacks are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that may override system policies, subvert intended behavior, and induce unsafe outputs. Existing…

Since buffer overflow has long been a frequently occurring, high-risk vulnerability, various methods have been developed to support spatial memory safety and prevent buffer overflow. However, every proposed method, although effective in…

Software-based fault isolation (SFI) is a technique to isolate a potentially faulty or malicious software module from the rest of a system using instruction-level rewriting. SFI implementations on CISC architectures, including Google Native…

Hardware and software of secured embedded systems are prone to physical attacks. In particular, fault injection attacks revealed vulnerabilities on the data and the control flow allowing an attacker to break cryptographic or secured…

Memory corruption is an important class of vulnerability that can be leveraged to craft control flow hijacking attacks. Control Flow Integrity (CFI) provides protection against such attacks. Application of type-based CFI policies requires…

ARM is becoming more popular in desktops and data centers, opening a new realm in terms of security attacks against ARM. ARM has released Pointer Authentication, a new hardware security feature that is intended to ensure pointer integrity…

Cryptographic algorithm implementations are vulnerable to Cold Boot attacks, which consist in exploiting the persistence of RAM cells across reboots or power down cycles to read the memory contents and recover precious sensitive data. The…

EMFI has become a popular fault injection (FI) technique due to its ability to inject faults precisely considering timing and location. Recently, ARM, RISC-V, and even x86 processing units in different packages were shown to be vulnerable…

Trusted execution environments in several existing and upcoming CPUs demonstrate the success of confidential computing, with the caveat that tenants cannot securely use accelerators such as GPUs and FPGAs. In this paper, we reconsider the…

Verifying integrity of software execution in low-end micro-controller units (MCUs) is a well-known open problem. The central challenge is how to securely detect software exploits with minimal overhead, since these MCUs are designed for low…

Heterogeneous distributed systems, including the Internet of Things (IoT) or distributed cyber-physical systems (CPS), often suffer a lack of interoperability and security, which hinders the wider deployment of such systems. Specifically,…