Related papers: Duty to Warn in Strategic Games

The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…

Probabilistic concurrent/distributed strategies have so far not been investigated thoroughly in the context of imperfect information, where the Player has only partial knowledge of the moves made by the Opponent. In a situation where the…

We study the strategic aspects of social influence in a society of agents linked by a trust network, introducing a new class of games called games of influence. A game of influence is an infinite repeated game with incomplete information in…

The basic problem in the cooperation theory is to justify the cooperation. Here we propose a new approach, where players are driven by their altruism to cooperate or not. The probability of cooperation depends also on the co-player's…

Delegation allows an agent to request that another agent completes a task. In many situations the task may be delegated onwards, and this process can repeat until it is eventually, successfully or unsuccessfully, performed. We consider…

In explaining altruistic cooperation and punishment, the challenging riddle is how transcendental rules can emerge within the empirical world. Game-theoretical studies showed that pool punishment, particularly second-order punishment, plays…

Justification logics are modal-like logics with the additional capability of recording the reason, or justification, for modalities in syntactic structures, called justification terms. Justification logics can be seen as explicit…

This article takes an oblique sidestep from two previous papers, wherein an approach to reformulation of game theory in terms of information theory, topology, as well as a few other notions was indicated. In this document a description is…

Maybe an event can't be modeled completely through on game but there is more chance with several games. With emphasis on players' rationality, we present new properties of strategic games, which result in production of other games. Here, a…

The commitment power of senders distinguishes Bayesian persuasion problems from other games with (strategic) communication. Persuasion games with multiple senders have largely studied simultaneous commitment and signalling settings.…

In the following paper we present a new semantics for the well-known strategic logic ATL. It is based on adding roles to concurrent game structures, that is at every state, each agent belongs to exactly one role, and the role specifies what…

Coalition Logic is a central logic in logical research on strategic reasoning. In a recent paper, Li and Ju argued that generally, models of Coalition Logic, concurrent game models, have three too strong assumptions: seriality, independence…

The Optional Public Goods Game is a three-strategy game in which an individual can play as a cooperator or defector or decide not to participate. Despite its simplicity, this model can effectively represent many human social dilemmas, such…

This paper develops a distributed resource allocation game to study countries' pursuit of targets such as self-survival in the networked international environment. The contributions are two. First, the game formalizes countries' power…

At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own…

An individual can only experience regret if she learns about an unchosen alternative. In many situations, learning about an unchosen alternative is possible only if someone else chose it. We develop a model where the ex-post information…

The field of Game Theory provides a useful mechanism for modeling many decision-making scenarios. In participating in these scenarios individuals and groups adopt particular strategies, which generally perform with varying levels of…

The article constructs a game-theoretic model of preventive measures for the antagonistic game with nature, that is such a model in which two participants take part, one of which is a regulating body (government) that makes legislative…

We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Specifically, we define the problem of task allocation in which…

Human cooperation depends on how accurately we infer others' motives--how much they value fairness, generosity, or self-interest from the choices they make. We model that process in binary dictator games, which isolate moral trade-offs…