Related papers: Replicator dynamics for the game theoretic selecti…

The modelling of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations requires microscopic processes that determine how strategies spread. The exact details of these processes are often chosen without much further consideration. Different types…

We study the effects of individual perceptions of payoffs in two-player games. In particular we consider the setting in which individuals' perceptions of the game are influenced by their previous experiences and outcomes. Accordingly, we…

We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…

Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…

Continuous-time game dynamics are typically first order systems where payoffs determine the growth rate of the players' strategy shares. In this paper, we investigate what happens beyond first order by viewing payoffs as higher order forces…

Recent work has shown that pairwise interactions may not be sufficient to fully model ecological dynamics in the wild. In this letter, we consider a replicator dynamic that takes both pairwise and triadic interactions into consideration…

What does it mean to fully understand the behavior of a network of adaptive agents? The golden standard typically is the behavior of learning dynamics in potential games, where many evolutionary dynamics, e.g., replicator, are known to…

In this paper we address a class of replicator dynamics, referred as polymatrix replicators, that contains well known classes of evolutionary game dynamics, such as the symmetric and asymmetric (or bimatrix) replicator equations, and some…

The theory of direct reciprocity explores how individuals cooperate when they interact repeatedly. In repeated interactions, individuals can condition their behaviour on what happened earlier. One prominent example of a conditional strategy…

A local agglomeration of cooperators can support the survival or spreading of cooperation, even when cooperation is predicted to die out according to the replicator equation, which is often used in evolutionary game theory to study the…

Reputation plays a crucial role in social interactions by affecting the fitness of individuals during an evolutionary process. Previous works have extensively studied the result of imitation dynamics without focusing on potential irrational…

In this work we study a weak Prisoner\^as Dilemma game in which both strategies and update rules are subjected to evolutionary pressure. Interactions among agents are specified by complex topologies, and we consider both homogeneous and…

Repeated interactions are ubiquitous and known to promote social behaviour. While research often focuses on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, experimental evidence suggests repeated interactions also foster fairness. This study…

In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…

A system of replicators with Hebbian random couplings is studied using dynamical methods. The self-reproducing species are here characterized by a set of binary traits and interact based on complementarity. In the case of an extensive…

We consider an integro-differential model for evolutionary game theory which describes the evolution of a population adopting mixed strategies. Using a reformulation based on the first moments of the solution, we prove some analytical…

Many complex adaptive systems contain a large diversity of specialized components. The specialization at the level of the microscopic degrees of freedom, and diversity at the level of the system as a whole are phenomena that appear during…

Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change of environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have…

We study games in which the set of strategies is multi-dimensional, and new agents might learn various strategic dimensions from different mentors. We introduce a new family of dynamics, the recombinator dynamics, which is characterised by…

Complex networks serve as abstract models for understanding real-world complex systems and provide frameworks for studying structured dynamical systems. This article addresses limitations in current studies on the exploration of individual…