Related papers: Bidding in Smart Grid PDAs: Theory, Analysis and S…
Auction is widely regarded as an effective way in dynamic spectrum redistribution. Recently, considerable research efforts have been devoted to designing privacy-preserving spectrum auctions in a variety of auction settings. However, none…
Electric storage units constitute a key element in the emerging smart grid system. In this paper, the interactions and energy trading decisions of a number of geographically distributed storage units are studied using a novel framework…
The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction (CMRA) is a new auction format used in recent European spectrum auctions. We show that an auction-specific version of truthful bidding leads to an efficient allocation. We then characterize…
This paper proposes a doubled-sided auction mechanism with price discrimination for social welfare (SW) maximization in the electricity and heating market. In this mechanism, energy service providers (ESPs) submit offers and load…
This paper studies the energy management in the coordinated multi-point (CoMP) systems powered by smart grids, where each base station (BS) with local renewable energy generation is allowed to implement the two-way energy trading with the…
As the adoption of distributed energy resources grows, power systems are becoming increasingly complex and vulnerable to disruptions, such as natural disasters and cyber-physical threats. Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy markets offer a practical…
This paper proposes a simple descriptive model of discrete-time double auction markets for divisible assets. As in the classical models of exchange economies, we consider a finite set of agents described by their initial endowments and…
This paper presents a framework to solve the strategic bidding problem of participants in an electricity market cleared by employing the full AC Optimal Power Flow (ACOPF) problem formulation. Traditionally, the independent system operators…
Peer-to-peer(P2P) energy trading may increase efficiency and reduce costs, but introduces significant challenges for network operators such as maintaining grid reliability, accounting for network losses, and redistributing costs equitably.…
Auctions have been proposed as a way to provide economic incentives for primary users to dynamically allocate unused spectrum to other users in need of it. Previously proposed schemes do not take into account the fact that the power…
Many real-world auctions are dynamic processes, in which bidders interact and report information over multiple rounds with the auctioneer. The sequential decision making aspect paired with imperfect information renders analyzing the…
We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict deadline. The service consumer requires a procurement strategy…
For decades, Simultaneous Ascending Auction (SAA) has been the most widely used mechanism for spectrum auctions, and it has recently gained popularity for allocating 5G licenses in many countries. Despite its relatively simple rules, SAA…
This paper presents a dynamic pricing and energy management framework for electric vehicle (EV) charging service providers. To set the charging prices, the service providers faces three uncertainties: the volatility of wholesale electricity…
This paper develops a machine learning-driven portfolio optimization framework for virtual bidding in electricity markets considering both risk constraint and price sensitivity. The algorithmic trading strategy is developed from the…
In many domains such as transportation and logistics, search and rescue, or cooperative surveillance, tasks are pending to be allocated with the consideration of possible execution uncertainties. Existing task coordination algorithms either…
We analyze the problem of a renewable generator who wants to sell its random generation in a two-stage market to a number of strategic, but flexible, load serving entities (LSEs). To offer an incentive to participate in the auction, the…
We introduce a new numerical framework to learn optimal bidding strategies in repeated auctions when the seller uses past bids to optimize her mechanism. Crucially, we do not assume that the bidders know what optimization mechanism is used…
Mechanism design for one-sided markets has been investigated for several decades in economics and in computer science. More recently, there has been an increased attention on mechanisms for two-sided markets, in which buyers and sellers act…
Understanding bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions remains an ongoing challenge for researchers. Despite their widespread use, theoretical insights into the bidding behavior, revenue ranking, and efficiency of commonly used multi-unit…