Related papers: Defending with Shared Resources on a Network
In classic network security games, the defender distributes defending resources to the nodes of the network, and the attacker attacks a node, with the objective to maximize the damage caused. Existing models assume that the attack at node u…
We address the problem of allocating limited resources in a network under persistent yet statistically unknown adversarial attacks. Each node in the network may be degraded, but not fully disabled, depending on its available defensive…
Ensuring the security of networked systems is a significant problem, considering the susceptibility of modern infrastructures and technologies to adversarial interference. A central component of this problem is how defensive resources…
It has been known that heterogeneous networks are vulnerable to the intentional removal of a small fraction of highly connected or loaded nodes, which implies that, to protect a network effectively, a few important nodes should be allocated…
We quantify the threat of network adversaries to inducing \emph{network overload} through \emph{routing attacks}, where a subset of network nodes are hijacked by an adversary. We develop routing attacks on the hijacked nodes for two…
In a graph G, a k-attack A is any set of at most k vertices and l-defense D is a set of at most l vertices. We say that defense D counters attack A if each a in A can be matched to a distinct defender d in D with a equal to d or a adjacent…
This paper studies the problem of defending (1D and 2D) boundaries against a large number of continuous attacks with a heterogeneous group of defenders. The defender team has perfect information of the attack events within some time (finite…
We study the problem of containing spreading processes in arbitrary directed networks by distributing protection resources throughout the nodes of the network. We consider two types of protection resources are available: (i) Preventive…
Stealthy attacks are a major cyber-security threat. In practice, both attackers and defenders have resource constraints that could limit their capabilities. Hence, to develop robust defense strategies, a promising approach is to utilize…
This paper addresses the security allocation problem in a networked control system under stealthy injection attacks. The networked system is comprised of interconnected subsystems which are represented by nodes in a digraph. An adversary…
This paper studies the vulnerability of flow networks against adversarial attacks. In particular, consider a power system (or, any system carrying a physical flow) consisting of $N$ transmission lines with initial loads $L_1, \ldots , L_N$…
We consider two capacity problems in P2P networks. In the first one, the nodes have an infinite amount of data to send and the goal is to optimally allocate their uplink bandwidths such that the demands of every peer in terms of receiving…
We focus on adversarial patrolling games on arbitrary graphs, where the Defender can control a mobile resource, the targets are alarmed by an alarm system, and the Attacker can observe the actions of the mobile resource of the Defender and…
Maximizing the damage by attacking specific nodes of the combat network can efficiently disrupt enemies' defense capability, protect our critical units, and enhance the resistance to the destruction of system-of-system~(SOS). However, the…
We investigate the vulnerabilities of consensus-based distributed optimization protocols to nodes that deviate from the prescribed update rule (e.g., due to failures or adversarial attacks). We first characterize certain fundamental…
Diffusion on complex networks is often modeled as a stochastic process. Yet, recent work on strategic diffusion emphasizes the decision power of agents and treats diffusion as a strategic problem. Here we study the computational aspects of…
We study a security game over a network played between a $defender$ and $k$ $attackers$. Every attacker chooses, probabilistically, a node of the network to damage. The defender chooses, probabilistically as well, a connected induced…
This paper addresses the security allocation problem within networked control systems, which consist of multiple interconnected control systems under the influence of two opposing agents: a defender and a malicious adversary. The adversary…
Effective game-theoretic modeling of defender-attacker behavior is becoming increasingly important. In many domains, the defender functions not only as a player but also the designer of the game's payoff structure. We study Stackelberg…
This work studies Stackelberg network interdiction games -- an important class of games in which a defender first allocates (randomized) defense resources to a set of critical nodes on a graph while an adversary chooses its path to attack…