Related papers: Optimal Common Contract with Heterogeneous Agents
This work studies the online contract design problem. The principal's goal is to learn the optimal contract that maximizes her utility through repeated interactions, without prior knowledge of the agent's type (i.e., the agent's cost and…
Given a network of agents, we study the problem of designing a distributed algorithm that computes k independent weighted means of the network's initial conditions (namely, the agents agree on a k-dimensional space). Akin to average…
Consider costly and time-consuming tasks that add up to the success of a project, and must be fitted into a given time-frame. This is an instance of the classic budgeted maximization (knapsack) problem, which admits an FPTAS. Now assume an…
Given a set of $m$ agents and a set of $n$ items, where agent $A$ has utility $u_{A,i}$ for item $i$, our goal is to allocate items to agents to maximize fairness. Specifically, the utility of an agent is the sum of its utilities for items…
In the combinatorial-action contract model (D\"utting et al., FOCS'21) a principal delegates the execution of a complex project to an agent, who can choose any subset from a given set of actions. Each set of actions incurs a cost to the…
In this paper, we investigate a constrained optimal coordination problem for a class of heterogeneous nonlinear multi-agent systems described by high-order dynamics subject to both unknown nonlinearities and external disturbances. Each…
We consider the classical mathematical economics problem of {\em Bayesian optimal mechanism design} where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn from a known…
This paper addresses the problem of collaboratively satisfying long-term spatial constraints in multi-agent systems. Each agent is subject to spatial constraints, expressed as inequalities, which may depend on the positions of other agents…
The hidden-action model captures a fundamental problem of principal-agent theory and provides an optimal sharing rule when only the outcome but not the effort can be observed. However, the hidden-action model builds on various explicit and…
We consider the problem of allocating multiple heterogeneous resources geographically and over time to meet demands that require some subset of the available resource types simultaneously at a specified time, location, and duration. The…
We introduce a stochastic principal-agent model. A principal and an agent interact in a stochastic environment, each privy to observations about the state not available to the other. The principal has the power of commitment, both to elicit…
Algorithmic contract design studies scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to exert effort on her behalf. In this work, we focus on settings where the agent's type is drawn from an unknown distribution, and formalize an offline…
Recently, Frazier et al. proposed a natural model for crowdsourced exploration of different a priori unknown options: a principal is interested in the long-term welfare of a population of agents who arrive one by one in a multi-armed bandit…
We study the problem of designing an optimal sequence of incentives that a principal should offer to an agent so that the agent's optimal behavior under the incentives realizes the principal's objective expressed as a temporal logic…
We consider a problem of prediction based on opinions elicited from heterogeneous rational agents with private information. Making an accurate prediction with a minimal cost requires a joint design of the incentive mechanism and the…
In this paper, we consider a general distributed system with multiple agents who select and then implement actions in the system. The system has an operator with a centralized objective. The agents, on the other hand, are selfinterested and…
In this paper we investigate a Principal-Agent problem with moral hazard under Knightian uncertainty. We extend the seminal framework of Holmstr\"om and Milgrom by combining a Stackelberg equilibrium with a worst-case approach. We…
The Hospital Residents setting models important problems like school choice, assignment of undergraduate students to degree programs, among many others. In this setting, fixed quotas are associated with the programs that limit the number of…
This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group…
We propose a distributionally robust principal agent formulation, which generalizes some common variants of worst-case and Bayesian principal agent problems. We construct a theoretical framework to certify whether any surjective contract…