Related papers: Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auc…
We consider the online Minimum-Cost Perfect Matching with Delays (MPMD) problem introduced by Emek et al. (STOC 2016), in which a general metric space is given, and requests are submitted in different times in this space by an adversary.…
We consider online procurement auctions, where the agents arrive sequentially, in random order, and have private costs for their services. The buyer aims to maximize a monotone submodular value function for the subset of agents whose…
The design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions, i.e. multi-item auctions over bundles of goods, is one of the most fundamental problems in computational economics, unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. In the…
We show that real-value approximations of Kolmogorov-Chaitin (K_m) using the algorithmic Coding theorem as calculated from the output frequency of a large set of small deterministic Turing machines with up to 5 states (and 2 symbols), is in…
A maximal matching can be maintained in fully dynamic (supporting both addition and deletion of edges) $n$-vertex graphs using a trivial deterministic algorithm with a worst-case update time of O(n). No deterministic algorithm that…
We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions where the valuation of an agent $i$ for a set $S$ of items can be…
We design novel mechanisms for welfare-maximization in two-sided markets. That is, there are buyers willing to purchase items and sellers holding items initially, both acting rationally and strategically in order to maximize utility. Our…
In this work, we study the classic submodular maximization problem under knapsack constraints and beyond. We first present an $(7/16-\varepsilon)$-approximate algorithm for single knapsack constraint, which requires…
In this paper we consider the online Submodular Welfare (SW) problem. In this problem we are given $n$ bidders each equipped with a general (not necessarily monotone) submodular utility and $m$ items that arrive online. The goal is to…
The Submodular Welfare Maximization problem (SWM) captures an important subclass of combinatorial auctions and has been studied extensively from both computational and economic perspectives. In particular, it has been studied in a natural…
We study fully dynamic algorithms for maximum matching. This is a well-studied problem, known to admit several update-time/approximation trade-offs. For instance, it is known how to maintain a 1/2-approximate matching in $\log^{O(1)} n$…
We consider the distributed version of the Multiple Knapsack Problem (MKP), where $m$ items are to be distributed amongst $n$ processors, each with a knapsack. We propose different distributed approximation algorithms with a tradeoff…
A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can observe the quality but it is unknown to buyers. This quality…
In this paper, we give new auction algorithms for maximum weighted bipartite matching (MWM) and maximum cardinality bipartite $b$-matching (MCbM). Our algorithms run in $O\left(\log n/\varepsilon^8\right)$ and $O\left(\log…
This paper considers the online machine minimization problem, a basic real time scheduling problem. The setting for this problem consists of n jobs that arrive over time, where each job has a deadline by which it must be completed. The goal…
In the problem of online portfolio selection as formulated by Cover (1991), the trader repeatedly distributes her capital over $ d $ assets in each of $ T > 1 $ rounds, with the goal of maximizing the total return. Cover proposed an…
Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at once has been a central question in economics and algorithmic…
We study truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in online bipartite matching. In our (multi-parameter) setting, every buyer is associated with a (possibly private) desired set of items, and has a private value for being assigned an…
We study the optimal mechanism design problem faced by a market intermediary who makes revenue by connecting buyers and sellers. We first show that the optimal intermediation protocol has substantial structure: it is the solution to an…
Maximizing a single submodular set function subject to a cardinality constraint is a well-studied and central topic in combinatorial optimization. However, finding a set that maximizes multiple functions at the same time is much less…