Related papers: Ethical Dilemmas in Strategic Games
Nguyen et al. [1] introduced altruistic hedonic games in which agents' utilities depend not only on their own preferences but also on those of their friends in the same coalition. We propose to extend their model to coalition formation…
The aim of this paper is to investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a group of agents and its coalition ability. We investigate this relation in the standard context of imperfect information concurrent game. We assume that…
This paper studies algorithmic decision-making under human's strategic behavior, where a decision maker uses an algorithm to make decisions about human agents, and the latter with information about the algorithm may exert effort…
When survival instincts conflict with human welfare, how do Large Language Models (LLMs) make ethical choices? This fundamental tension becomes critical as LLMs integrate into autonomous systems with real-world consequences. We introduce…
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare…
Differences in perception, information asymmetries, and bounded rationality lead game-theoretic players to derive a private, subjective view of the game that may diverge from the underlying ground-truth scenario and may be misaligned with…
In the age of AI, human commanders need to use the computational powers available in today's environment to simulate a very large number of scenarios. Within each scenario, situations occur where different decision design options could have…
The actions of intelligent agents, such as chatbots, recommender systems, and virtual assistants are typically not fully transparent to the user. Consequently, using such an agent involves the user exposing themselves to the risk that the…
At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own…
We provide a formal definition of blameworthiness in settings where multiple agents can collaborate to avoid a negative outcome. We first provide a method for ascribing blameworthiness to groups relative to an epistemic state (a…
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is a logical framework in which one can describe in great detail how actions are perceived by the agents, and how they affect the world. DEL games were recently introduced as a way to define classes of games…
Many real-world situations of ethical relevance, in particular those of large-scale social choice such as mitigating climate change, involve not only many agents whose decisions interact in complicated ways, but also various forms of…
This paper examines the integration of computational complexity into game theoretic models. The example focused on is the Prisoner's Dilemma, repeated for a finite length of time. We show that a minimal bound on the players' computational…
The neutrality thesis holds that technology cannot be laden with values. This long-standing view has faced critiques, but much of the argumentation against neutrality has focused on traditional, non-smart technologies like bridges and…
We define a new concept of "mistake" strategies and actions for strategic-form and extensive-form games, analyze the relationship to prior main game-theoretic solution concepts, study algorithms for computation, and explore practicality.…
Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing…
When designing or analyzing multi-agent systems, a fundamental problem is responsibility ascription: to specify which agents are responsible for the joint outcome of their behaviors and to which extent. We model strategic multi-agent…
We propose a finite automaton-style solution concept for supergames. In our model, we define an equilibrium to be a cycle of state switches and a supergame to be an infinite walk on states of a finite stage game. We show that if the stage…
Substantial efforts have been made in developing various Decision Modeling formalisms, both from industry and academia. A challenging problem is that of expressing decision knowledge in the context of incomplete knowledge. In such contexts,…
Decision-theoretic agents predict and evaluate the results of their actions using a model, or ontology, of their environment. An agent's goal, or utility function, may also be specified in terms of the states of, or entities within, its…