Related papers: Disclosure Games with Large Evidence Spaces

The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…

In this paper we model a game such that all strategies are non-revealing, with imperfect recall and incomplete information. We also introduce a modified sliding-block code as a linear transformation which generates common knowledge of how…

We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…

Recent literature highlights the advantages of implementing social rules via dynamic game forms. We characterize when truth-telling remains a dominant strategy in gradual mechanisms implementing strategy-proof social rules, where agents…

Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the…

Studying games in the complete information model makes them analytically tractable. However, large $n$ player interactions are more realistically modeled as games of incomplete information, where players may know little to nothing about the…

Covering and packing problems can be modeled as games to encapsulate interesting social and engineering settings. These games have a high Price of Anarchy in their natural formulation. However, existing research applicable to specific…

The growing use of machine learning models in consequential settings has highlighted an important and seemingly irreconcilable tension between transparency and vulnerability to gaming. While this has sparked sizable debate in legal…

We analyze how dynamic information should be provided to uniquely implement the largest equilibrium in binary-action coordination games. The designer offers an informational put: she stays silent if players choose her preferred action, but…

So far, the theory of equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is insensitive to communication possibilities. To address this issue, we incorporate the assumption that communication reduces -- but does not…

We show a communication complexity lower bound for finding a correlated equilibrium of a two-player game. More precisely, we define a two-player $N \times N$ game called the 2-cycle game and show that the randomized communication complexity…

Two-player zero-sum repeated games are well understood. Computing the value of such a game is straightforward. Additionally, if the payoffs are dependent on a random state of the game known to one, both, or neither of the players, the…

We consider a team-production environment where all participants are motivated by career concerns, and where a team's joint productive outcome may have different reputational implications for different team members. In this context, we…

Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…

We study zero-sum differential games with state constraints and one-sided information, where the informed player (Player 1) has a categorical payoff type unknown to the uninformed player (Player 2). The goal of Player 1 is to minimize his…

This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…

We show that in any $n$-player $m$-action normal-form game, we can obtain an approximate equilibrium by sampling any mixed-action equilibrium a small number of times. We study three types of equilibria: Nash, correlated and coarse…

Transparency of information disclosure has always been considered an instrumental component of effective governance, accountability, and ethical behavior in any organization or system. However, a natural question follows: \emph{what is the…

In this paper we introduce the novel framework of distributionally robust games. These are multi-player games where each player models the state of nature using a worst-case distribution, also called adversarial distribution. Thus each…

The assumptions of necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies, also known as perfect prediction, lead to at most one surviving outcome, immune to the knowledge that the players have of them. Solutions concepts implementing…