Related papers: NC Algorithms for Popular Matchings in One-Sided P…
Let $G$ be a bipartite graph where every node has a strict ranking of its neighbors. For every node, its preferences over neighbors extend naturally to preferences over matchings. Matching $N$ is more popular than matching $M$ if the number…
In a graph where vertices have preferences over their neighbors, a matching is called popular if it does not lose a head-to-head election against any other matching when the vertices vote between the matchings. Popular matchings can be seen…
The efficient computation of large matchings with desirable guarantees is a crucial objective in market design. However, even in simple two-sided matching markets with weak ordinal preferences, finding a maximum-size stable matching is…
The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. We consider a useful variation of the…
In this paper, we give a simple characterization of a set of popular matchings defined by preference lists with ties. By employing our characterization, we propose a polynomial time algorithm for finding a minimum cost popular matching.
Given a bipartite graph G = (A u B, E) with strict preference lists and and edge e*, we ask if there exists a popular matching in G that contains the edge e*. We call this the popular edge problem. A matching M is popular if there is no…
Matching plays a vital role in the rational allocation of resources in many areas, ranging from market operation to people's daily lives. In economics, the term matching theory is coined for pairing two agents in a specific market to reach…
We consider the max-size popular matching problem in a roommates instance G = (V,E) with strict preference lists. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M' in G such that the vertices that prefer M' to M outnumber those that prefer…
Is matching in NC, i.e., is there a deterministic fast parallel algorithm for it? This has been an outstanding open question in TCS for over three decades, ever since the discovery of randomized NC matching algorithms [KUW85, MVV87]. Over…
We are given a bipartite graph $G = \left( A \cup B, E \right)$. In the one-sided model, every $a \in A$ (often called agents) ranks its neighbours $z \in N_{a}$ strictly, and no $b \in B$ has any preference order over its neighbours $y \in…
Let G = ((A,B),E) be an instance of the stable marriage problem where every vertex ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. A matching M in G is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching. Popular…
We consider the problem of matching applicants to posts where applicants have preferences over posts. Thus the input to our problem is a bipartite graph G = (A U P,E), where A denotes a set of applicants, P is a set of posts, and there are…
Given a bipartite graph, where the two sets of vertices are applicants and posts and ranks on the edges represent preferences of applicants over posts, a {\em rank-maximal} matching is one in which the maximum number of applicants is…
We consider the problem of finding a maximum popular matching in a many-to-many matching setting with two-sided preferences and matroid constraints. This problem was proposed by Kamiyama (2020) and solved in the special case where matroids…
We consider the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of two-sided preferences and two-sided lower quotas. The input to our problem is a bipartite graph G=(A U B, E), where each vertex in A U B specifies a strict…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
We consider many-to-one matching problems, where one side corresponds to applicants who have preferences and the other side to houses who do not have preferences. We consider two different types of this market: one, where the applicants…
Two actively researched problem settings in matchings under preferences are popular matchings and the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences. In this paper, we apply the optimality notion of the first topic to the…
We consider a matching problem in a bipartite graph $G=(A\cup B,E)$ where nodes in $A$ are agents having preferences in partial order over their neighbors, while nodes in $B$ are objects without preferences. We propose a polynomial-time…
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…